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INTRODUCTION 
Timber management on U.S. Forest Service land often conflicts, 
to some degree, with nontimber resources and/or the desires of certain 
interest groups. The use of economic analysis as a decision criterion 
for proposed Forest Service timber sales is not yet a well defined 
process. This paper presents one method of economic analysis for the 
evaluation of proposed Forest Service timber sales, and discusses the 
integration of quantifiable timber management economics with other 
resource impacts which may be difficult to quantify economically. 
While this study was prepared for the special case of the Ketchikan 
Salvage Sale proposed in northwestern Montana, the methods developed 
here are fairly easy to employ — only basic algebra and a hand-held 
calculator were used — and should be applicable to other proposed 
Forest Service timber sales. 
The Ketchikan Sale was designed to salvage roadless timber 
stands recently involved in a bark beetle outbreak, and has generated 
considerable controversy. Due to the unique condition and location of 
the sale area, different public constituencies have very divergent 
views as to how the Forest Service should react to the beetle in­
festation. The area is critical habitat for grizzly bear and gray 
wolf, which are officially threatened and endangered species. Wild­
life biologists and conservationists argue that various development 
activities in the vicinity increase the need for the Forest Service to 
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maintain its remaining roadless areas in a wild condition. The 
Forest Service and those oriented toward timber production hold 
that the area should be roaded and logged in order to utilize dead 
trees before they lose their timber value, to limit the bark beetle 
epidemic, and to reduce the fire hazard resulting from the dead trees. 
This may appear to be a fairly typical conflict faced by the 
Forest Service in attempting to manage public lands for "multiple 
use" where timber production and other resources tend to be mutually 
exclusive. However, the economics of this particular sale further 
complicate the issue. The Forest Service prepared an economic analysis 
of the proposed sale which concluded that the sale would have a nega­
tive net present value. Opponents of the sale were perplexed as to 
why the Forest Service should damage critical wildlife habitat while 
losing money managing the timber resource. The Forest Service dis­
missed its own analysis, claiming that the logging industry would 
"bid up" the sale to a point which would make it a positive economic 
investment. 
That assuption, based on recent bidding activity for local 
Forest Service timber sales, was the source of much confusion re­
garding the economics of the Ketchikan Sale. Forest Service timber is 
sold at auction to the highest bidder, subject to a minimum bid. The 
minimum bid is derived through a detailed appraisal and residual 
pricing system which attemptps to determine the selling value of the 
lumber that could be obtained from the sale, less all costs (including 
profit) necessary to convert the sale stumpage to finished lumber (see 
page 23). The problem here is that actual bids for Forest Service 
timber in recent years have often been several times higher than the 
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bids predicted by the Forest Service appraisal. Even though many 
sales on the Flathead National Forest had recently been appraised 
at low or even negative values, several had sold for relatively high 
bids. Regardless of the reasons for this "bidding up" (which may in­
clude such things as inaccurate estimates of milling costs, scaling 
measurements which underestimate milling efficiency, or bidder specu­
lations that lumber values would significantly appreciate over the 
contract period), the fact that the Forest Service could not accurately 
predict the selling value of the sale naturally would lead to dif­
ficulties in the economic analysis prepared by the Forest Service for 
the sale. 
The analysis presented here will attempt to reduce the confusion 
surrounding.the economics of the Ketchikan Sale. Two fundemental 
flaws in the Forest Service analysis will be dealt with: inability 
to predict accurately the selling value of stumpage, and failure to 
include certain timber management costs resulting from the sale. 
Benefits and costs of timber management will be considered over one 
full rotation (100 years), rather than the 20 year period used by 
the Forest Service. The results of this analysis show that the 
Ketchikan Sale would be an investment with very negative returns in 
terms of timber management economics. 
The Ketchikan Sale may be unique in many respects, but similar 
conflicts involving deficit salvage sales and noncommodity resources 
on Forest Service land may occur in the future. A recent study, using 
very conservative assumptions, concluded that a great deal of Forest 
Service timber is already being sold at a loss (Barlow, et al, 1980). 
Section 6k of the 1976 National Forest Management Act (NFMA) is inter­
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preted by some authorities as mandating economic efficiency — benefits 
equal or exceed costs — in Forest Service timber management (Stoel, 
1978; Krutilla and Haigh, 1978), but the implementing regulations only 
call for cost efficiency — least cost — in meeting assigned pro­
duction goals [36 CFR 219.12 (b) (3) (iii)]. The Forest Service 
Northern Region Draft Plan states that nationally assigned timber 
production goals cannot be met unless salvage sales are more aggres­
sively pursued and existing roadless areas are accessed with capital 
funds (not timber receipts) at a greatly accelerated rate (USDA 1981c). 
This means that capital funds must be used to subsidize timber sales 
where road costs exceed the value of harvestable timber; an econo­
mically inefficient practice. Salvage sales are excepted from im­
portant restrictions placed on timber management activity by the NFMA 
regarding size of opening, prohibition of timber harvest on "marginal 
lands," prohibition of timber harvest before culmination of mean 
annual increment, and prohibition of timber harvest above the sus­
tained yield-allowable cut level. Thus, salvage sales could be used 
to circumvent NFMA constraints which were designed to insure economic 
efficiency of, and to protect nontimber resources impacted by, Forest 
Service timber harvesting. 
Such items suggesting future policy debates over Forest Service 
deficit salvage sales will be discussed after examining the economic 
analysis of the Ketchikan Sale. However, the geopgraphic, historic, 
and ecological contexts within which the area must be managed will 
be discussed before presenting the economic analysis. The wildlife 
habitat issue and the cummulative developmental pressures in the 
vicinity are largely beyond the scope of any economic analysis of a 
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timber sale and must be considered as seperate factors in making 
a land management decision on the salvage sale proposal. While the 
salvage sale proposal implies that insect damage can be controlled 
and economic loss can be reduced, the ecology of the particular 
insect and forest ecosystem must be understood before such claims 
can be made or evaluated. 
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NORTH END SALVAGE SALES AND APPEALS 
In the spring of 1980, the Flathead National Forest released 
a controversial Environmental Assessment Report (EAR) for four pro­
posed timber sales on the Glacier View Ranger District. The four 
sales were collectively titled the North End Salvage Sales and in­
cluded: Frozen Lake, 350 acres; Ketchikan, 5,800 acres; Thoma, 180 
acres; and Trail, 390 acres (USDA, 1980a). The sale areas are located 
within the Mt. Hefty, Tuchuck, and Thompson-Seaton roadless areas, 
all of which were recommended for nonwilderness allocation by the RARE 
II process. The North End Salvage areas are on or very near the 
Canadian border and mostly within the Trail Creek Drainage, which is 
a tributary of the North Fork of the Flathead River, a national Wild 
and Scenic River. The areas are at the very northern end of the 
Flathead National Forest. The Kootanai National Forest lies to the 
west, the North Fork of the Flathead River flows south on the east 
side of the areas, and private land lies along the North Fork and 
Trail Creek, to the east and southeast. The North Fork of the Flathead 
River also forms the western boundary of Glacier National Park (see 
map). 
The EAR considered several alternatives designed to salvage dead 
and "high risk" lodge pole pine (Pinus contorta Douglas var. latifolia 
Englemann) in response to a recent mountain pine beetle Dendroctonus 
pondersae Hopkins) outbreak. A controversy arose in reaction to plans 
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which called for building more than 20 miles of road and cutting timber 
in some 6,720 acres or roadless areas considered by many wildlife 
biologists to be critical habitat for the officially threatened 
grizzly bear (Ursus arctos horribilus) and endangered gray wolf 
(Canus lupus). One sale alone, the Ketchikan Sale, was to cover 
5,800 acres of roadless area and included 16.1 miles of road. The 
controversy was exacerbated by the economic analysis completed by the 
Flathead National Forest, which indicated that the Ketchikan Sale 
alone would amount to a net present worth loss of $880,000 (USDA, 
1980a). 
On August 6, 1980, the Flathead National Forest released a 
Supplement to the EAR which announced Forest Service plans to go 
ahead with one of the proposed alternatives. To reduce impacts on 
grizzly habitat, the chosen alternative was substantially altered 
fron the alternatives analyzed in the EAR (e.g. the Ketchikan Sale 
was reduced to 2,300 acres with 11.3 miles of new road), but no 
analysis was made of the economic consequences of these modifications. 
The Supplement also concluded that an Environmental Impact Statement 
(EIS) was not necessary for the proposal. The conclusion was based 
on a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) determination that the 
proposed sales (with an extensive list of mitigation requirements) 
were "not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the grizzly 
bear, gray wolf, and bald eagle" (USDA 1980b). 
The Defenders of Wildlife and the Flathead chapter of the 
Montana Wilderness Association appealed the timber sales, largely 
on the grounds that the decision to forgo an EIS was wrong. The 
appellants argued in part that the grizzly bear and gray wolf habitat 
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issue had not been properly addressed, especially in terms of cum-
mulative development activities occurring in the vicinity of the 
proposed sales. They also questioned the need for the proposed sales 
at a time when the national lumber economy is depressed, the local 
annual timber cut appears to exceed the local mill capacity (USDA, 
1980a), and the Forest Services's own economic analysis concluded 
that the proposals would lose well over $880,000. 
After denial of the appeal at the Flathead Supervisor's Office 
and the Northern Regional Office, the appellants were jained by the 
Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund and the appeal was taken to the Chief 
of the Forest Service in the Washington D.C. Office. The Chief denied 
the appeal in the fall of 1981 and all four sales were immdiately 
offered at auction. The three small sales sold, but the Ketchikan 
Sale failed to receive any bids. The Flathead National Forest tem­
porarily withdrew the sale, planning to reoffer it in the spring of 
1982. The appellants sought to have the sale withdrawn until the 
issue could be considered in the upcoming Integrated Forest Plan 
(the draft is due to be published in February, 1983). They also 
kept open the option of taking the appeal to court if the sale were 
reoffered and sold. 
Over the winter, the Flathead National Forest made changes in 
the sale package, hoping to make the sale more attractive to bidders. 
The appellants maintained efforts to block the sale and a summary 
of this study was made available to the staff of Senator Max Baucus 
for use in discussion of the sale with the Forest Supervisor. On 
April 6, 1982, the Supervisor announced that the sale proposal would 
be dropped until the forest plan could be completed. 
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CRITICAL HABITAT AND CUMMULATIVE IMPACTS 
In letters printed in the EAR and Supplement, Dr. Charles 
Jonkel, Director of the University of Montana Border Grizzly project, 
Dr. Robert Ream, Director of the University of Montana Wolf Ecology 
Project, and Thomas Hay, Regional Supervisor of the Montana State 
Department of Fish and Game, all stated that the Ketchikan area is 
very important wildlife habitat, especially for grizzly bear, gray 
wolf and Dolly Varden trout. Jonkel and Ream were particularly con­
cerned about cummulative developmental impacts in the vicinity, and 
the lack of Forest Service attention to those cummiulative impacts. 
These letters indicate that the Ketchikan Sale is a major portion of 
one of the last undeveloped areas in the vicinity which is suitable 
for grizzly bear and wolf habitat. The Missoulian reported the follow­
ing reactions to the FWS decision that the North End Salvage sales 
would not jeopardize the grizzly bear or gray wolf: 
Jonkel, one of the leading bear experts in the world today, 
said he was amazed by the federal agency's decision that 
the Ketchikan salvage logging will not jeopardize the grizzly 
bear.-
"I don't know how in God's name they could have come 
to the conclusion they did," he said, adding that the 
Ketchikan area is "extremely good grizzly habitat — some 
of the best habitat west of the Continental Divide." 
Ream voiced a similar reaction to the agency's decision. 
"I was really surprised when they came out with it," he said. 
The logging plans might have been acceptable had not 
surrounding areas already faced such extensive development, 
(Jonkel) said. But now, Ketchikan "for some of the bears 
might be the last option." (Schwennesen, 1980a). 
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The cumraulative impacts which worry Jonkel, Ream and others, 
include extensive logging in Canada, the Kootanai National Forest, 
and adjacent private and Flathead National Forest lands, coal mining 
in Canada, oil and gas drilling Canada, seismic exploration all around 
and possibly within the area, potential electricity transmission 
corridors, pipelines, increased housing development in the North Fork 
valley, road construction and improvement to support the above and 
other developments, and increasing hunting, trapping, and recreation 
pressures. Logging in the vicinity is especially extensive, due to 
the mountain pine beetle outbreak. Just over the Canadian border, 
approximately $1 billion worth of coal lies near the surface, seismic 
exploration has been extensive, and two oil and gas wells are being 
drilled (Jonkel, 1979). Seismic exploration is proposed for much of 
the North Fork drainage; Amoco has filed a prospecting plan for a 
seismic line (a 30 pound explosive charge detonated every 220 feet for 
20 miles) that runs right through the Ketchikan area (Schwennesen, 
1981c). A BPA transmission corridor and pipelines from Canada are 
possible in the vicinity (Schwennesen, 1980b). Increased recreation, 
hunting, and trapping use and a new policy in Glacier National Park 
requiring the destruction of bears involved in two encounters with 
humans, put additional pressures on grizzly bears in the vicinity. 
The Ketchikan Sale is not the only proposed development in the 
North Fork Valley which is being actively opposed by conservationists. 
A Canandian firm is seeking permits for two open pit coal mines — 
each one mile wide and 1,000 feet deep — Just five miles north of the 
sale area. The proposed Cabin Creek mines spurred the creation of 
the. Flathead River Basin Environmental Impact Study, which is nearing 
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completion of several year long investigation designed to provide 
comprehensive baseline environmental data for the Flathead Basin. 
The Cabin Creek mines have also united many Canadian and U.S. citizen 
groups concerned about threats to wildlife and the pristine qualities 
of the North Fork Valley {Lakes, 1982). 
For similar reasons, a Federal Highway Administration proposal 
to pave a ten mile stretch of the North Fork road at the south end 
of the valley is drawing considerable public opposition. Even the 
FWS has ruled that this project (as originally proposed) would 
jeopardize the continued existence of the grizzly bear and gray wolf. 
The U.S. Park Service and the Montana Department of Fish and Game also 
oppose the paving project, while the U.S. Forest Service and the 
Montana Department of State Lands support it (USDOT, 1982). 
Meanwhile, north of the border, the British Columbia Forest 
Service has undertaken a very extensive response to the pine beetle 
outbreak. With 7,000 acres already "salvaged" and 47,000 acreas left 
dead, BCFS plans to spend $4.5 million over the next 4-5 years to 
simply flatten 23,000 acres of non-commercial timber stands. The 
BCFS recently announced plans to cut an additional 1 ,235 acres of 
beetle infested lodgepole just over one mile from Glacier National 
Park (Schwennsen, 1981a; 1981b; 1981d). 
Taken together, these developmental pressures pose serious 
threats to the remaining wildlife and wildness in the North Fork 
Valley. The Forest Service is required by law to manage National 
Forest lands for multiple-use resources, and to maintain and enhance 
habitat for threatened and endangered wildlife. Placed in this con­
text, a decision on the Ketchikan Sale should carefully weigh the 
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damage done to wildlife habitat against the need for, and benefit 
of, intensive timber management on this particular tract. 
The Forest Service offered three basic reasons for supporting 
the Ketchikan Sale (to combat the pine beetle epidemic, reduce fire 
hazards, and utilize timber that would otherwise go to waste), while 
implying that impacts on wildlife would be negligible. For example: 
Dick Call, ranger of the Glacier View District which 
oversees the sale, says leaving all that dead timber could 
trigger a large forest fire. And that would be bad for 
both bear and man. 
"I do not feel too well about allowing 19 million board 
feet of timber go to waste," he says. 
• • • 
"We've been logging for 40 years (in the North Fork)," 
he says. "My personal observation is that the bears are 
increasing." (O'Harra, 1982a). 
As discussed above, wildlife experts are quite concerned by 
the potential impacts which this sale would have on wildlife. A 
permanent road system and increased human activity in the Ketchikan 
area are seen as greater threats to the grizzly bear than is the risk 
of fire (Jonkel, 1979). The following sections will demonstrate that 
there is-no foundation for assumptions that the Ketchikan Sale would 
combat the mountain pine beetle epidemic or that it would reduce the 
"waste" of timber resources. 
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MOUNTAIN PINE BEETLE AND LODGEPOLE PINE; 
ECOLOGY AND ECONOMICS 
The prospectus for the Ketchikan Sale states: "This sale is 
being sold to reduce the spread of the mountain pine beetle," (USDA 
1981d). This statement flies in the face of studies published by 
Forest Service entomologists and other experts on the mountain pine 
beetle. In order to evaluate possible land management decisions made 
in reaction to a mountain pine beetle epidemic, it is necessary to 
review the history of control attempts, the ecological role of the 
beetle, and the literature concerning the economics of insect control. 
Mountain Pine Beetle Control History 
Although the first recorded outbreak of mountain pine beetle 
(Dendroctonus Ponderosas Hopkins) in Rocky Mountain lodgepole Pinus 
contorta Douglas var. latifolia Engleman) forests occurred in Flathead 
County in 1909 (USDA, 1979; Klein, 1978), it is believed that the 
mountain pine beetle has coexisted and probably coevolved with lodge-
pole pine from the beginning of the tree's existence (Cole and Amman, 
1980; Peterman 1978). Forest Service attempts to control the mountain 
pine beetle in lodgepole forests of the Rocky Mountains were initiated 
in 1912 in the Flathead and Beaverhead National Forests. Extensive 
and largely unsuccessful control attempts have been made throughout 
the western U.S. from that time to the present, and actual control 
of an epidemic is now generally considered not to be economically 
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efficent (Furniss and Carolin, 1980; Klein, 1978). Control techniques 
have included underburning, felling and peeling, felling and burning 
(in one case over 1,800 acres of lodgepole were cleared, wind-rowed 
and burned), burning individual trees with flame throwers, spraying 
with various chemicals, and even wrapping individual trees with 
explosive cord and detonating (Klein,.1978). Currently, management 
techniques can protect individual trees (at high cost) and can some­
times delay the spread of an outbreak, but the consensus of Forest 
Service experts seems to be that management of the mountain pine 
beetle should be limited to; individual tree or stand protection 
where economically justified, prevention of future outbreaks through 
manipulation of tree age and species diversity where justified by 
timber values, or simply allowing nature to run its course in many 
cases (Cole and Amman, 1980; Klein, 1978; Cole, 1978; Amman et at, 
1977). This history of extensive and unsuccessful control attempts 
is blamed on an inadequate understanding of mountain pine beetle 
ecology (Klein, 1978; Peterman, 1978). 
Lodgepole Pine/Mountain Pine Beetle Ecology 
Lodgepole pine is often a dominant species in forest eco­
systems where wildfire and bark beetles play important roies. The 
following synopsis of lodgepole/beetle ecology is taken largely from 
Peterman (1978) and two Forest Service publications on the mountain 
pine beetle in lodgepole pine (Cole and Amman, 1980; Amman et al, 
1977). 
Lodgepole pine occurs in western North America from Alaska 
south to Baja California and east to Wyoming and Colorado, ranging 
from sea level to 11,500 feet in Colorado. Lodgepole is considered 
a serai, shade intolerant, prolific seed producing tree, which means 
that it is quick to colonize distrurbed forest sites, but may be 
subject to replacement by species which are more shade tolerant. 
However, lodgepole often persists as the dominant species on forest 
sites where other trees are considered the climax species. This 
persistence can be attributed to several aspects of lodgepole ecology, 
including fire and bark beetles (Brown, 1975; Pfister and Daubenmire, 
1975). 
Lodgepole pine can begin producing cones at 5 to 10 years of 
age (Latham, 1965; Crossley, 1956) with each cone containing 25 to 
40 seeds (Armit, 1966; Bates, 1930; Clements, 1910). These cones 
are often serotinous, meaning they will not open to release seeds 
unless subjected to high temperatures (such as in fires), and seeds 
may remain viable for 75 years (Mason, 1915). An old lodgepole 
stand can have in storage hundreds of thousands of seeds per acre, 
ready to be released by an event such as fire (Lotan, 1975). This 
reproductive system often leads to development of dense, stagnated 
stands which are susceptible to mountain pine beetle attack and high 
fuel build-up, setting the stage for an intense fire followed by 
establishment of a new lodgepole pine stand. Repetition of this 
cycle can be seen as a mechanism which allows the serai lodgepole 
pine to persist as a dominant species while at the same time pro­
viding habitat for the mountain pine beetle. What on the face may 
appear to be a parasitic attack on one species by another, may actually 
be a classic case of coevolutionary mutualism. 
Further evidence of this mutualism can be found in the life 
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cycle and habits of the mountain pine beetle in lodgepole pine. 
Usually in late summer, new adult beetles emerge and attack living 
trees, where they construct galleries and lay eggs in the inner bark. 
Larvae move horizontally while feeding on the inner bark and kill the 
trees by effectively girdling them, cutting off the trees' nutrient 
transport system (the phloem). Several species of blue-stain fungi 
(e.g., Ceratocytis montia Rumb., and Europhium clavigerum Robinson 
and Davidson), which are carried from tree to tree by the adult 
beetles, seem to regulate moisture conditions within affected trees 
in a manner which is beneficial to the developing larvae. Thus, 
additional species may be involved in the coevolutionary, mutualistic 
cycle. In fact, some authorities state that it is the blue-stain 
fungi, not the beetle, which kills the trees by invading and des­
troying living tissues.^ It appears that the beetle/fungi association 
behaves as a mutualistic system where the beetle transports the 
fungi from host to host and the fungi weakens and conditions the host 
to the benefit of the beetle (Safranyik et al, 1975). 
Beetle population aynamics are affected by several factors 
(including tree diameter, phloem thickness, tree age, stand density, 
and climate) such that epidemics are most common in lodgepole stands 
over 8U years of age and rarely occur in stands under 60 years of 
age, nor at high elevation. This gives the stand plenty of time to 
accumulate a considerable seed reservoir and fuel loading, thus en-
1 It may occur to some that control strategies aimed at the 
beetle may be misplaced if the fungi is the killing agent. I 
have not seen a discussion of this in the literature. 
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hancing the probability of fire and subsequent reseeding of lodgepole 
pine following any beetle outbreak. 
Breaking this cycle by preventing large wildfires (which were 
a periodic part of lodgepole ecosystems until recent human suppression 
practices) can be expected to allow forest succession to proceed to 
climax (replacement of lodgepole by other species) where lodgepole 
is serai. Fire suppression and prevention may be increasing the total 
habitat suitable for (and size of) bark beetle outbreaks by allowing 
more lodgepole stands to escape burning and live past age 60-80. If 
a beetle epidemic kills a dominant lodgepole stand, and fire does 
not occur to give lodgepole its reproductive advantage after a fire 
(and if a seed source for more shade tolerant species is available), 
the stand would eventually convert to a climax species such as fir 
or spruce. This type of conversion would create species and age 
mosaics which would significantly reduce the effects of future bark 
beetle epidemics, given the beetle's habits which limit outbreaks to 
lodgepole pine at least 60 years of age. Thus, while there may be 
large short-term losses of lodgepole pine volume during an outbreak, 
leaving the stand alone after an outbreak could lead to a situation 
where long-range timber productivity would not be seriously impaired 
(Wellner, 1978). 
Understanding the ecology of lodgepole pine and mountain pine 
beetle evokes a comparison between beetle management and fire manage­
ment. In the late 1960's, the Forest Service began to realize that 
its inflexible policy of aggressively suppressing all fires was often 
counterproductive. Fire is now being seen as a mangement tool and 
is often either allowed to burn naturally or even set deliberately 
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1 
to attain management goals. Similarly, it has been suggested that 
some mountain pine beetle outbreaks be allowed to run their course 
2 
naturally, as a management tool. Under certain conditions, the 
mountain pine beetle is expected to convert current stagnant stands 
to more economically desirable future stands (Peterman, 1978). For 
resources other than timber, a beetle outbreak generally has negli­
gible to positive impacts (Wellner, 1978). A recent Forest Service 
publication on the mountain pine beetle (Cole and Amman, 1980) concurs 
with other authorities that: 1) salvage or sanitation cuttings 
cannot prevent or deter beetle outbreaks; 2) salvage operations 
should be justified either directly by timber economics or indirectly 
by impacts on other resources which warrant subsidization; and 3) a 
"do-nothing" policy is often preferred (Cole, 1978; Peterman, 1978; 
Wellner, 1978; Amman et al, 1977). 
Forest Pest Economics 
There is a surprising lack of literature on the subject of 
Forest pest economics. As one authority puts it, 
It is striking that so little good economic analysis 
has been done on forest pest management, considering 
the controversies over spray projects, the sizable annual 
outlays, and the dramatic impact of pests on forest growth. 
Recent compendia on forest economics and policy, e.g. Clawson, 
Research in Forest Economics and Policy, have almost nothing 
Vor instance, see Troy Fire Management Plan, 1979. Kootanai 
National Forest, USDA Forest Service, Troy, Montana. 
2 The Forest Service has engaged in extensive, expensive and 
controversial attempts to control another forest insect, the Douglas 
fir tussock moth. Recent studies suggest that the moth may actually 
be beneficial to forest productivity while control and salvage opera­
tions may cause more damage to the timber resource than the insect 
(Corkran, 1980; USDA, 1978). 
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to say on the economics of forest protection (Irland, 1980). 
General pest management systems theory has faired somewhat 
better. A 1976 review of that subject has 159 citations (Ruesink, 
1976). In this general field, the economic optimization of pest 
control activities has received considerable study. The concept of 
economic threshold has been discussed since at least 1959 (Stern, 
et al) and is now defined as; 
That population where the marginal benefit from damage 
prevented by the control program is equal to the marginal 
cost of realizing that population through a control pro­
gram (Hall and Norgaard, 1973). 
If a pest control program is to be economically efficient, the 
economic threshold (as defined above) for the particular control 
program should be identified accurately, and pest damages below that 
threshold should be tolerated (Norgaard, 1976; Stern, 1973). Despite 
frequent calls for economic efficiency, forest pest control practice 
has not kept up with theory: 
economic thresholds, where they are set at all, are set 
arbitrarily and are dictated largely by emotional responses 
. . . fear of what might occur rather than any Justified 
economic base. The many absurd "control projects" committed 
in the name of protection are possible only through govern­
ment subsidy (Stark, 1971). 
That economic efficiency rather than vague notions of "good 
forestry" should be the major decision criterion in forest management 
investment is not a new position to be taken by professional foresters 
(Newport, 1962; Stoltenberg, 1959). Arguments that economic efficiency 
should be applied to forest insect control are not new either (Marty and 
Allison, I960; Johnson, 1963). And yet, very expensive forest insect 
control projects are pursued to this day and are often arbitrarily 
justified by "good forestry," or emotional reactions to "waste" or 
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potential fire hazard. Where a benefit/cost analysis is employed, 
it is often very poorly designed (Irland, 1977). For example, a 
General Accounting Office investigation of a proposal to salvage 
lodgepole pine involved in a mountain pine beetle outbreak in eastern 
Oregon concluded that the Forest Service analysis of the project was 
flawed to the point of uselessness because it omitted or understated 
costs, used improper procedures, used unreliable or outdated data, 
and failed to develop and analyze alternatives properly (U.S. Comp­
troller General, 1976). 
The following analysis will identify and attempt to correct 
similar problems in the economic analysis prepared by the Flathead 




The economic analysis of the Ketchikan Sale which was prepared 
by the Flathead National Forest for use in the North End Salvage EAR 
was flawed in many ways with repect to the sale proposal which was 
actually offered for bid. For instance, the original proposal 
evaluated in the EAR involved much more timber volume and road con­
struction than the sale ultimately offered, but no revision was ever 
made in the economic analysis to examine these changes. The EAR 
analysis failed to include many timber management costs (i.e. sale 
preparation, sale administration, site preparation, fuel treatment, 
planting or thinning) that would result from the sale. While pur­
porting to be simply a salvage operation, the proposal called for 
a permanent road system and the economic analysis claimed as a benefit 
the harvest of a very large volume of larch twenty years after the 
initial entry. All other benefits and costs of future timber manage­
ment in the area were ignored. The analysis also used an extremely 
low estimate of the proportion of dead volume in the sale. 
Perhaps the biggest problem with the Flathead National Forest's 
economic analysis lies in its timber resource valuation methodology. 
The value of the timber was set by averaging the sum of.estimated 
logging costs, the estimated road costs and statistical high 
bid^ received for twelve timber sales on the Glacier View Ranger 
District from August, 1977 to October, 1978. The average value was 
found to be $207.32/m.b.f. This figure was calculated using an 
average of $21.81/m.b.f. for road costs, but an examination of the 
timber sale reports for the twelve sales indicates that the estimated 
road cost averaged only $5.96/m.b.f. The actual sum of logging costs, 
road costs and statistical high bid for these sales ranged from 
$120.14/m.b.f. to $309.05/m.b.f. Any value based on such a wide 
range of data would be statistically quite weak. 
Although site-specific logging and road cost estimates were 
subtracted from this average resource value to calculate the benefits 
of the initial entry, the value of the larch harvest planned for 
twenty years later was calculated using a Forest-wide (not District-
wide) average statistical high bid for larch with no attempt to ad­
just for any site-specific costs other than road construction. 
These methods for valuing the two harvests are quite inconsistent. 
The results of the Forest's economic analysis indicated that 
the Ketchikan Sale would have a benefit/cost ratio of 0.76 and would 
be a net present loss of $882,992. However, the Flathead decided to 
offer the sale anyway, believing that the sale would be "bid up" by 
competing buyers to a level well above the value at which it was ap­
praised. Some timber sales on the Flathead National Forest had been 
"bid up" by as much as six times the appraised value during the period 
1 
Statistical high bid is the winning bid (high bid) less pur­
chaser credit. Purchaser credit is the value of timber that the 
purchaser is allowed to remove without payment, as compensation for 
road construction expenses. Thus, statistical high bid represents 
actual financial payment received by the Forest Service. 
immediately preceeding the offering of the Ketchikan Sale (Armstrong, 
1981). This "bidding up" indicates that the pricing method employed 
by the Forest Service is no longer functional as a means of predicting 
stumpage prices. 
The Forest Service uses a residual pricing system to determine 
the stumpage value at which to sell its timber. In this system, the 
selling value for finished lumber is determined and all manufacturing, 
transportation, and logging costs, along with an allowance for profit, 
are subtracted from the lumber selling value. The resulting residual 
price is considered the fair market stumpage value at which bidding 
"I 
may begin (Davis, 1966). If, as in the Ketchikan case, this process 
results in a negative indicated stumpage value (a deficit sale), then 
the advertised rate is set at a minimum base rate. This residual 
pricing system allows for timber to be sold at stumpage rates well 
below what would be required to recover all timber management costs 
associated with producing that timber (Barlow et al, 1980). 
The Flathead's inability to estimate the selling value of its 
timber accurately placed it in the contradictory position of demon­
strating that the sale has a negative economic value while at the same 
time preparing and offering the sale. Conservationists opposing the 
sale were perplexed as to why the Forest did not seize the opportunity 
to forgo a negative timber management investment while at the same 
time protecting wildlife habitat and other multiple-use resources. 
Coupled with the denial of its own analysis, the Flathead's omission 
1 
An excellent paper explaining the Forest Service's residual 
pricing method is available from John A. Combes, Timber Management, 
Northern Region Office, USDA Forest Service, Missoula, Montana. 
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of timber management costs, its inconsistent methodology for valuing 
benefits, and its inability to predict an accurate selling value 
created very fertile ground for misunderstanding and misinterpretation 
of the sale's economics by those on both sides of the controversy. 
New Approach 
This paper was initiated in an attempt to rectify these problems 
and clarify the economics of the Ketchikan Sale. The economic analysis 
given here is not presented as a hind-sight correction of the Flat­
head's analysis. In fairness to the Forest, much of the methodology 
and data used here were developed after the Flathead's analysis was 
undertaken. This analysis is offered as a new approach, using the 
most recent and site-specific methodology and data available. For 
instance, a new transaction evidence model for stumpage valuation 
on the Flathead was used to overcome the inability to predict the 
selling value of the sale's timber accurately. Except for the pre­
diction of road costs, all methodology and values used here are the 
same as those employed in the preparation of the Flathead forest plan. 
It is hoped that this study will help clarify the economics 
of the Ketchikan sale for both sides in the debate. If this raethc-
dology and data had been available at the outset of preparation of 
the Ketchikan Sale, and if the Flathead had used it to predict the 
timber selling value and management costs associated with the sale, 
a good deal of time and money might have been saved, and much mis­
understanding avoided by both sides in the controversy. 
1 
The Draft Flathead National Forest Plan is due to be published 
February, 1983. 
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For instance, use of the stunipage valuation equation (explained 
below) would have predicted that the original sale would not receive 
any bids. Some Forest Service officials still maintain that the 
Ketchikan Sale was the victim of a lumber market which dropped during 
the lengthy appeals process. Although real lumber price, lumber 
1 
tally for lodgepole pine has continued to drop since it peaked in 
1 
mid 1978, the current real lumber price, log scale for lodgepole pine 
is actually slightly above the average for large timber sales sold on 
the Flathead during 1978 (calculated from Flathead Large Sale Data 
computer printout dated 11/5/81, USDA, 1981e). This surprising 
situation can be attributed to an increase in the real value of by­
products (chips) and to improved milling efficiency. These factors 
have offset reductions in lumber price, lumber tally, so that even 
though the lumber market price has declined, the vlaue of a thousand 
board feet of logs has remained fairly constant. 
The Flathead stumpage valuation model predicts that the ori­
ginally offered sale would not have sold even under the peak con­
ditions of 1978. However, the model predicts that the modifications 
made in the sale contract over the winter were sufficient to have 
allowed the revised sale to sell, provided that there are buyers in 
the vicinity willing to contract to cut timber at the present 
1 
Lumber price, lumber tally is the price of a unit of milled 
lumber. Lumber price, log scale is the price of wood products which 
can be milled from a unit of raw logs. Lumber price, log scale is 
derived by adding the value of by-products such as chips obtained 
in the milling of a unit of logs to the lumber price, lumber tally 
and then multiplying the sum by an overrun factor. The overrun 
(or recovery) factor is a measure of milling efficiency. Current 
log scaling methods seriously underestimate the volume of lumber 
that today's sawmills can produce from a unit of logs. 
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1 
time. But as shown below, even if the sale had sold for the pre­
dicted bid, it would not have covered the timber management costs 
associated with it. 
Methods and Assumptions 
The approach used here is very similar to a bare land or site 
expectation analysis based on the Faustmann formula (also known as 
soil expectation, land rent or land expectation vlaue. See Davis, 
1966). The essential difference between this analysis and the Faust­
mann formula is that here costs and benefits of harvesting the exist­
ing stand are added to the costs and benefits of managing timber over 
2 
only the next rotation. The Faustmann formula would ignore the 
existing stand and would consider an infinite series of rotations 
beginning with stand establishment. This analysis was limited to 
one rotation because all calculations were done manually, and any 
costs or benefits accruing after the first rotation would have minimal 
present values (for instance, a $5 million harvest 200 years from now 
would have a gross present value of $1,960 using a 4% discount rate, 
and only a $5 present value using 7 1/8%). 
The inclusion of existing stand values allows a marginal economic 
analysis of the sale as a timber management investment. By including 
future benefits and costs, the high initial road costs (which would 
1 
The model is based on local transaction evidence from the 
period July, 1974 - January, 1980, and thus may overvalue stumpage 
during periods fo extreme lumber industry stagnation and low timber 
demand. 
2 A rotation is the period between timber harvest on a particular 
site. 
27 
not be covered by the net timber value of the initial sale) can be 
more equitably attributed to future as well as initial uses J Fixed 
annual benefits and costs (e.g. grazing receipts or general adminis­
tration costs) are not included here. Such annual receipts or expenses 
at the district or forest level should not be significantly affected 
by a decision to proceed with or forgo the Ketchikan Sale. 
The planning horizon for the analysis was increased from the 
20 years used in the EAR to 100 years (one full rotation), and the 
net present value through the first rotation was calculated based on 
current stand conditions, scheduled management activity, and pro­
jected yield estimated in detailed working papers prepared for each 
cutting unit by the district silviculturalist (Wilson, 1981). This 
entailed quantifying all management costs (i.e. road construction 
and reconstruction, road engineering and administration, sale pre­
paration and administration, site preparation and fuel treatment, 
planting, stocking surveys, and thinning) and expected benefits 
2 
(stumpage values for all commercial harvests) in constant dollars 
discounted to the present. (While 100 years may stretch the limits 
of prognostication at this point is time, using the silviculturalist's 
detailed projections of yield and management activity through one 
1 This approach (mixing benefits and costs of initial harvests 
with those of future harvests) can become problematic where an old 
growth stand may have high value on a site with a negative bare land 
value. It would be possible in such a case to have a positive net 
present value (in terms of timber management economics) even though 
management costs would exceed benefits for all future harvests. 
This situation is not encountered here. 
2 All values are adjusted for inflation using the quarterly GNP 
Implicit Price Deflator Indices reported in the Survey of Current 
Business (USDOC, 1979-82). 
rotation allows a virtual state of the art estimate of timber manage­
ment costs and benefits without resorting to a computer. Since vir­
tually all of the models and value data used here are taken from the 
Flathead FORPLAN computer model, it should be relatively easy for the 
Forest Service to use its computers to apply this approach to an in­
finite series of rotations when preparing future economic analyses 
of timber sales). 
Three discount rates were applied; 4%, 7 1/8%, and 10%. 
The debate over the proper discount rate for public forestry has 
not yet been settled, but these three rates seem to cover the range 
of common argument (O'Toole, 1981; Mikesell, 1977; Samuelson, 1976). 
The 4% rate was recently proposed by the Forest Service as the rate 
it will use in its planning process, along with a 7 1/8% rate as a 
sensitivity test (USDA, 1981b). Use of the lower discount rate for 
public forestry is often supported by foresters and conservationists 
because higher rates reduce the age at which timber matures finan­
cially. Foresters also worry that a higher discount rate would pre­
clude investment in timber management on much slow-growing public 
timberland currently committed to timber production. Economists 
supporting the lower rate often argue that since public entities 
incur lower risk than private enterprise, the public rate of discount 
should be similar to the marginal real interest rate born by low risk 
financial instruments (i.e. AAA rated bonds). Other economists argue 
that the public discount rate should approximate the marginal rate 
for private industry engaged in similar activity. A recent canvass 
of timber companies in the Pacific Northwest concluded that the 
marginal rate for the industry was approximately 7% - 8% (O'Toole, 
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1981). This is very close to the 7 3/8% rate recommended by the 
Water Resources Board for public works. On the upper end, the Office 
of Management and Budget has insisted for several years that 10% is 
the proper social rate of discount. 
Benefits were estimated through the use of a stumpage valuation 
model developed for the Flathead in the spring of 1981 for use in 
the forest plan (USDA, 1981a). The model is a multiple regression 
equation based- oh 39 large timber sales sold on the Flathead National 
Forest during the period July, 1974 through January, 1980. The equa­
tion is adjusted for inflation and uses sale-specific factors and 
market variables to predict the selling value of timber on the Flat­
head. Predicted real increases in lumber price, production costs 
and overrun factor for the Flathead were included in the estimation 
of timber selling value for future harvests (see Appendix A). (Ap­
plication of this equation to the Ketchikan Sale is unique in that 
the data base for the Flathead stumpage valuation model included no 
sales with such a large proportion of dead timber. The fact that 
this sale contains 73% dead timber, much of it dead since 1979, may 
create a situation in which the equation would tend to overvalue 
the sale stumpage). 
Another recently developed model was used to predict initial 
entry road construction costs and reconstruction costs for future 
management entries. Jackson and Loveless (1981) have generated a 
multiple regression equation based on 52 road construction and re­
construction contracts let by the Forest Service Northern Region 
during fiscal years 1979 and 1980. This equation is adjusted for 
inflation and is as accurate as .an Engineer's Cost Estimate while 
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being relatively simple to apply. The construction costs predicted 
by this equation were adjusted downward to allow for Bacon-Davis 
wage rates and a recent trend indicating reduced road construction 
bids in the Northern Region (See Appendix B). 
Other costs were taken from documentation of the FORPLAN analysis 
prepared for the Flathead Forest Plan (USDA, 1981a). These costs are 
based on 1980 experienced costs and are adjusted for inflation. These 
costs have also been presented in a manner which allows adjustment 
for many site-specific factors such as unit size, percent slope, 
habitat type, harvest and yarding methods, etc. (see Appendices C - E). 
Two other assumptions made here are that the road system pro­
posed for the Ketchikan Sale will not be extended to access additional 
stands and that timber mangement will be limited to the units included 
in the current proposal. These limits were imposed as wildlife 
habitat mitigation, and it is assumed that this mitigation will con­
tinue through the planning period. Detailed documentation of assump­
tions, methods and mathematical operations appear in the appendices. 
Results 
The above methods and assumptions were applied to two potential 
outcomes of the Ketchikan Sale; Case 1 and Case 2. These examples 
were employed in order to reflect the predictive nature of the cost 
and benefit valuation methodology used. An examination of the ap­
pendices shows that great effort was made to make the valuation metho­
dology as detailed and specific as possible with respect to the con­
ditions which would be experienced for the Ketchikan Sale area. 
These values are based on actually experienced values for recent 
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sales in the same vicinity. However, at some point such valuation 
must be based on some sort of average. For instance, the regression 
equation used to predict stumpage value (Appendix A) is much more 
responsive to sale-specific factors (i.e. current lumber price, 
contract length, logging method, haul distance, volume per acre, and 
tree diameter) than is the method used in the Flathead National 
Forest's EAR (an average of predicted logging and road costs plus 
statistical high bid for several timber sales on the same ranger 
district, less predicted logging and road costs for the Ketchikan 
Sale). While no statistical analysis is available for the reliability 
of the latter method, the regression equation has an of .806 and 
confidence intervals of approximately ± 30% at the 95% confidence 
level.^ 
Case 1 assumes that the sale will sell for the advertised rates 
and that the roads will be constructed using the contributed funds and 
purchaser credit offered in the current sale package. This represents 
the minimum bid for which the sale could be sold, and avoids reliance 
on estimates derived from the regression equations for initial sale 
1 
Although this 30% confidence interval is rather wide, the 
equation is superior to the residual price appraisal method. The 
regression equation is more responsive to sale-specific conditions; 
has the ability to incorporate expected changes in lumoer milling 
efficiency, logging costs, and lumber values; and is easier to apply 
to future sales. In addition, the equation would appear to be much 
more accurate than a method which has been underestimating bids on 
the Flathead National Forest by six to eight times. This study used 
mean values — not statistical ranges — for the various value data 
because mean values represent the best available estimates, avoid 
excess calculations and confusion, and because statistical analyses 
are not available for most of the data. 
stumpage value and road costs. Case 2 assumes that the sale will 
sell for the bid predicted by the transaction evidence models for 
stumpage value and road costs. This assumption predicts the selling 
bid under conditions experienced on the Flathead during the period 
1974 to 1980 and may tend to overestimate the selling bid for the 
Ketchikan Sale, given the unusually large proportion of deal volume 
in the sale and the currently stagnated timber market. Thus, these 
two cases present a range into which the actual bid could have fallen 
(probably nearer to Case 2). 
Both cases are based on the most recent modifications pro­
posed for the sale (Armstrong, 1982b). The computation of discounted 
present values is shown in Appendix F. The results given below are 
in fourth quarter 1981 dollars. 
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This study indicates that timber management economics cannot 
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be used to justified the Ketchikan Sale. Except for road construction 
costs, all costs and benefits were estimated using the same methods 
and values that the Flathead National Forest is using in the develop­
ment of its forest plan. These cost and benefit values were applied 
to all timber management activities and harvest yields projected by 
the district silviculturalist for the next 100 years. The results 
show that the Ketchikan Sale would have a net present value of 
"$154,000 to "$704,000, and a benefit/cost ratio ranging from 0.88 to 
0.14. In terms of timber management economics, the proposed Ketchikan 
Salvage Sale would be a greater loss than would a no-harvest policy 
allowing the timber to de'cay and regenerate naturally. 
Since the road system is to be closed except during timber 
management activity, the only other benefits which could possible 
be claimed for the Ketchikan Sale proposal are insect and fire damage 
reduction. Both are primarily associated with the timber resource. 
As shown earlier, the Forest Service's own experts agree that mountain 
pine beetle control or salvage should be justified by timber management 
economics. 
While fire mangement costs were included here (they are direct 
costs of timber management on Forest Service land), fire hazard re­
duction benefits were omitted due to time and data constraints. 
However, the methodology is available to estimate the benefits and 
costs associated with events, such as fire, which involve uncertainty 
and risk (Halvorsen and Ruby, 1981; Hirshleifer- and Riley, 1 9 7 9 ) .  
The Forest Service Rocky Mountain Region has developed a methodology 
specifically for evaluating benefits and costs associated with mountain 
pine beetle control, including fire' management (Averill et at., 1 9 7 7 ) .  
An analysis of fire management benefits attributable to the 
Ketchikan Sale proposal would entail determining the value and 
probability of suppression costs and resource losses, both with and 
without the sale. This would include modeling of fuel types, rates 
of spread, size at control, suppression costs and resource damage 
under both the with and without assumptions. Probability of fire, 
derived from local fire statistics, could then be used to estimate 
monetary values under each condition, and risk analysis could be 
applied to evaluate the either/or decision in terms of fire manage­
ment.^ If fire management is to be claimed as a benefit for a timber 
sale, such an analysis should be made. 
While the omitted benefits, if any,-are related to fire manage­
ment, the costs of the Ketchikan Sale proposal which have been omitted 
here include wildlife habitat destruction (especially critical threat­
ened and endangered species habitat), watershed and fisheries damage, 
and aesthetic disruption near a national park and a national wild and 
scenic river. A rational decision based on economics for the Ketchikan 
Sale would weigh the timber management present net loss of $154,000 to 
$704,000 plus unquantified wildlife habitat, watershed and aesthetic 
damage against unquantified fire suppression benefits. 
If economic efficiency were required in Forest Service timber 
1 
A computer model which may be capable of this sort of analysis 
is being developed by the U.S. Forest Service's Pacific Southwest 
Station. Called the "Fire Economics Evaluation System," a prototype 
is planned to be tested in the Rocky Mountain-Intermountain Climate 
Zone by 1985. See Marcia Wood, "Is your fire management program 
'economically efficient'?" Forestry Research West. Sept., 1982, 
pp. 5-9. USDA Forest Service, Ft. Collins, Colorado. 
management, the minimum acceptable (or marginal) bid for the Ketchikan 
Sale would be that which would give the sale a net present value of 
zero. For example, to offset the net present loss shown above for 
Case 2, the present value of the predicted bid for the initial sale 
would have to increase by $312,038 (under the 7 1/8% discount rate). 
This would require a stumpage price of $91.69 per m.b.f., which is 
$29.72 (48%) more than the bid predicted by the Flathead stumpage 
1 
valuation model and $90.04 more than the advertised rate. In other 
words, had the Ketchikan Sale been reoffered, the Forest Service would 
have accepted a bid as low as $1.65 per m.b.f., even though timber 
management costs would not be covered unless the bid was at least 
$91.69 per m.b.f. 
Even using the upper confidence interval at the 95% confidence 
level for the stumpage valuation equation, the predicted bid would be 
$61.08 per m.b.f., still $30.61 short of covering timber management 
costs. Only under the 4% discount rate could the 30% confidence 
interval for the equation possibly give the timber management economics 
of the Ketchikan Sale a positive present net value. Correctly stated, 
at the 95% confidence level, assuming a 4% discount rate, the expected 
net present value for Case 2 would range from +$80,171 to -$388,319, 
with an expected mean of "$154,074. The associated benefit/cost ratio 
would range from 1.06 to 0.69, with a mean of 0.88. For reasons 
discussed above, the slightly positive outcome at the upper limit of 
Vrom Appendix A, the predicted bid was $45.66 (first quarter 
1978) which converts to $61.97 fourth quarter 1981 using the factor 
199.58 T 147.05. 
this confidence interval is considered improbable. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Economic analysis cannot and should not be the sole criterion 
in Forest Service land management decisions, but the use of economics 
in decision-making can and should be improved. In the Ketchikan 
case, a proper application of economic analysis to timber management 
clearly shows that timber management economics do not support the sale. 
Other criteria which must be considered include damage to critical 
wildlife habitat, watershed, fisheries and aesthetic resources in a 
relatively pristine area of national significance which is facing 
intense developmental pressures on many fronts. 
These negative impacts must be weighed against the unevaluated 
fire management situation. If fire hazard is a problem which must 
be addressed, a fire management economic analysis should be made, 
not only of the proposed timber sale, but also of alternatives which 
deal directly with the fire hazard problem, including a no-action 
alternative. In cases such as the Ketchikan Sale where the main re­
source threatened by fire (timber) has a negative present value, a 
no-action policy for fire hazard reduction may be justified. An 
analysis of risk and uncertainty should be conducted, especially in 
a case such as this, where a proposed action would have certain 
negative impacts on many resources while the action would only pos­
sibly reduce impacts from uncertain future events. 
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At least on the Flathead National Forest, the forest planning 
process has developed methodology and values which can be used for 
vastly improved timber management benefit/cost analyses. Timber 
management costs have been identified and sale specific stumpage 
values can now be predicted. This information should be applied to 
the economic analyses of future timber sales. The current residual 
pricing method employed by the Forest Service should be replaced by 
more appropriate methods. For instance, the long term timber manage­
ment costs for the sale area could be estimated to set a marginal 
price. The stumpage valuation model could then be used to predict 
the price that the timber industry would be willing to pay. Proposed 
sales with a predicted selling value falling below the marginal price 
could be eleminated from further consideration (thereby preventing 
the waste of time and money for both the Forest Service and groups 
opposing controversial sales). Proposed sales with predicted selling 
values exceeding the marginal price could then be examined to compare 
timber management benefits with unquantifiable costs to other re­
sources. 
Timber management on national forest lands is primarily a 
commodity production activity. Although the Forest Service is con­
strained by multiple-use resource considerations where a private 
timberland owner would be more or less free to manage soley for 
maximum timber production profits, there is no reason why Forest 
Service timber management should not be economically efficient. 
This is not to say that all Forest Service management ac­
tivities should be rigidly constrained by quantified economic analy­
ses. Many national forest resources are non-commodity in nature 
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(e.g., wildlife, watershed) and are difficult, it not impossible, 
to quantify. Where commodity production such as timber management 
has quantifiable value and conflicts with noncommodity resources 
such as endangered species habitat, subjective decisions must be made, 
because such things as wildlife habitat and extinction cannot be 
objectively quantified in economic terms. Commodity production can be 
rendered to objective economic analysis, and when such an analysis 
indicates that the commodity has a negative value, a rational decision 
would forgo commodity production. 
There may be cases where timber cutting could support noncom­
modity resource, multiple-use goals (e.g. production of brush for big 
game browse might be increased by cutting some trees to open up a 
dense forest canopy, allowing more light to reach the forest floor). 
Unfortunately, multiple-use rhetoric is often used after controversy 
arises to justify timber sales originally planned to meet timber pro­
duction goals. An example is the proposed Canyon Creek Sale on the 
Bitterroot National Forest. Part of that sale calls for clearcuts 
which are objected to by many area citizens. After the Forest's own 
economist had determined that if the clearcuts were removed, the 
sale would have positive, rather than the current negative timber 
management economics, the Forest Supervisor and Regional Forester 
both argued that the clearcuts were necessary to enhance nontimber 
resources. 
Although public pressure and the current economic situa:tion 
finally convinced the Supervisor of the Flathead National Forest 
to withdraw the Ketchikan Sale, had a willing buyer appeared last 
fall,..the Forest Service would have let the sale at a significant 
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economic loss. 
Sales such as Ketchikan and Canyon Creek are not isolated events. 
A study released by the Natural Resources Defense Council in 1980 
(Barlow et al) shows that even under conservative assumptions, a great 
deal of Forest Service timber is managed at a loss and that a signifi­
cant number of national forests operate their timber management func­
tion at a net loss. Part of the problem is the result of the residual 
pricing method currently used to set Forest Service stumpage prices. 
Instead of setting the price at a level which would return timber 
management costs, the residual pricing method attempts to determine 
what a purchaser would be able to pay, net of all estimated production 
costs. This method is clearly inaccurate and incapable of insuring 
economic efficiency in timber management. In addition to economic 
inefficiency, Barlow, et al., argue that this residual pricing method 
leads to reduced timber production on the nation's most productive 
lands — the small, privately owned timberlands. Since the Forest 
Service is the largest single producer of timber in the U.S., the 
Forest Service practice of selling timber below production costs 
maintains an artificially low market price for stumpage and creates 
disincentives for private production. 
Beyond the pricing problem there appears to be great potential 
for future conflicts between noncommodity resources and economic 
efficiency in timber management on one side, and deficit salvage 
sales such as Ketchikan on the other. Great pressure is being put 
on Forest Service line officers to meet timber production quotas. 
These quotas are set by largely political decisions made at the 
Washington D.C. level and are passed down the line. 
41 
Although the National Forest Management Act limits timber pro­
duction on national forests to land which is biologically, physically, 
technologically and economically capable of producing timber, the 
definitions of these limits are the subjects of debate and manipula­
tion. For instance, the regulations implementing the NFMA define the 
economic limit as cost effectiveness in meeting assigned goals, while 
some authorities argue that the NFMA calls for economic efficiency 
In timber management (Krutilla and Haigh, 1978; Stoel, 1978). Re­
gional Plans are maintaining the antiquated definition of commercial 
forest land as any site capable of producing 20 cubic feet/acre/year, 
even though many respondents to the plans argue that the appropriate 
definition is closer to 50 or even 100 cubic feet/acre/year. 
The Northern Region Plan states flatly that the region will 
be unable to meet its assigned timber production goals unless capital 
funds are used to access roadless areas at a greatly accelerated 
pace — meaning that timber must be cut in areas where road costs 
exceed timber values — and salvage sales are offered in larger 
numbers (USDA 1981c, pp. 44-22 & 44-23). Salvage sales are excepted 
from important restrictions placed on timber management activity by 
the NFMA regarding size of opening, prohibition of timber harvest 
on "marginal lands," prohibition of timber harvest before culmination 
of mean annual increment, and prohibition of timber harvest above the 
sustained yield-allowable cut level. These restrictions were created 
to regulate timber cutting on national forest land, largely for the 
protection of nontimber resources which are adversely impacted by 
extensive cutting and elimination of old growth stands. Thus, use 
of the salvage loophole in NFMA may lead to many future conflicts 
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between timber management and other forest resources. 
Those concerned with these potential future conflicts should 
identify and deal with the political and policy decisions which force 
the issue. Salvage sales should be justified either by positive 
timber management economics in excess of negative impacts to other 
resources, or by compelling management needs of other resources, not 
by emotional appeals to prevention of waste or "good forestry" which 
cannot be supported by rational analysis. 
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Appendix A 
STUMPAGE VALUE ESTIMATES 
Stumpage. value is estimated here using methods developed by 
Jackson and McQuillan (1979) and Merzenich (1979). In the spring 
of 1981, Merzenich derived a multiple regression equation based on 
data from 39 large timber sales sold on the Flathead National Forest 
during the period July 1974 through January 1980. The equation uses 
market variables and sale-specific site factors to estimate what the 
logging industry would be willing to pay for the stumpage in a par­
ticular sale, assuming that environmental protection, road maintenance 
and temporary development costs are zero. The equation gives this 
stumpage value in first quarter 1980 dollars, has an adjusted of 
.806, and has a standard error of $19.90 (15% of the mean predicted 
high bid). Thus, at the 95% confidence level, the confidence interval 
is ± $39.80 (30%). Merzenich's equation is being used in the economic 
portion of FORPLAN by the Flathead National Forest in the development 
of its Integrated Forest Plan (USDA, 1981a). 
Initial Entry Stumpage Value 
By substituting the mean value for the independent variable 
dealing with ineffective purchaser credit (which is unknown for the 
Ketchikan Sale), the Flathead equation can be simplified to the 
k k  
form: 
Y - "283.28 + 0.3814x^ + 0.563X2 - O.AgS^x^ - 0.660x^ 
+ 101.36x^ - 35.57Xg + 0.6037Xg - 0.4369Xg 
where: 
Y = high bid value/ra.b.f. (first quarter 1980 dollars) 
x. = weighted average lumber price, log scale (first quarter 
1980 dollars/m.b.f. 
x^ = contract length in months 
x^ = percent of sale volume jammer logged 
x^ = percent of sale skyline logged 
Xp = natural log of the weighted median d.b.h. 
t) 
Xg = a dummy variable for SBA sales 
Xg = volume/acre harvested (m.b.f.) 
Xg = total haul distance in miles 
The stumpage value for the Ketchikan Sale is estimated using 
the above equation and the following independent variable values. 
Data sources, assumptions used, and derivation of each value are 
also given below: 
x^ = 247.82 The derivation of this value is shown below. The 
species and percent net volumes are taken from the Sale 
Prospectus. The lumber price, log scale, is taken from the 
"West Side Zone Index Operation #6" in the most recent 
update of lumber prices for Forest Service Region One 
1 
(Combes, 1982), except dead lodgepole and dead white pine. 
The first lumber price, log scale, shown is in fourth 
quarter 1981 dollars and is deflated to first quarter 
1980 dollars using the GNP Implicit Price Deflator Indeces: 
171.23 7 199.58 = .8580. 
1 
These prices for dead species are extrapolated from the live 
prices using the lumber tally price and overrun factor for dead lodge-
pole found at FSM SUPP. R-1 281 11 /81 2422.34—3 and using the 15% 
reduction in lumber tally price and 9.8% reduction in overrun for dead 
white pine found in the Appraisal Summary for the Ketchikan Sale. 
45 
Species % net VolJ x L.P.L.S. x Deflation = Weighted L.P.L.S. 
(1981 $) Factor dst Qtr. 1980 $) 
L-DF 1 ,100/12,200 350.86 .8580 27.14 
S-0 590/12,200 343.09 .8580 14.24 
SAF 240/12,000 261.65 .8580 4.42 
LPL 1 ,340/12,200 317.22 .8580 29.89 
LPD 8,900/12,000 273.40 .8580 171 .12 
WPL 10/12,200 500.18 .8580 0.35 
WPD 20/12,200 400.89 .8580 0.56 
247.72 
^2 = 26.5 (from the Sale Prospectus) The unusual operating 
season limits prescribed by the contract could add risks 
(costs) not measured by this' equation. 
x^ = 3.1 (from the Contract Volume Summary, 361,308711,665,804) 
x^ = 0 (from the Contract Volume Summary) 
x_ = 2.485 Average d.b.h. by species from the sawlog Appraisal 
5 
Table (Sale Cruise Computer printout dated 4/30/81 with 
correction of dead lodgepole volume dated 7/10/81) was 
converted to median d.b.h. by adding the difference between 
average d.b.h. and median d.b.h. for each species computed 
for sales over 1 m.m.b.f. on the Flathead from 7/74 to 
5/81 (printout dated 11/5/81 on file in the Regional 
Office). The resulting median d.b.h. was weighted by 
% net volume of the total sale by species as corrected 
in the Sawlog Appraisal Table. This weighted median d.b.h. 
was found to be 12, the natural log of which is 2.485. 
x, = 0 The sale was not offered as a Small Business Set-Aside. 
o 
Xq = 13 (from the Sale Prospectus) 
o 
x = 56 (from the Appraisal Summary) 
Substituting these values for the independent variables in the 
above equation gives the following estimated bid: 
1 
This does not include 160 m.b.f. of unsound sapwood which has 
no listed lumber price. Inclusion of the unsound sapwood would tend 
to reduce the weighted average lumber price for this sale. 
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Y = -283.28 + 0.3814(24.72) + 0.563(26.5) - 0.4954(3.1) - 0.660(0) 
+ 101.36(2.485) - 35.57(0) + 0.6037(13) - 0.4369(56) = 59.84 
This is the predicted high bid value (first quarter 1980 dollars) 
for the Ketchikan Sale assuming that environmental protection, road 
maintenance and temporary development costs are zero. The current 
Appraisal Summary estimates these costs to be $6.37, $4.07 and $1.20 
1 per m.b.f. respectively. Subtracting these costs (deflated to first 
quarter 1980 dollars), the predicted high bid becomes; 
59.84 - (6.37 + 4.07 + 1.20)(.8580) = 49.85 
In order to estimate the dollar benefits to accrue to the 
Ketchikan Sale, the above stumpage value must be added to the slash 
disposal deposits required in the sale contract. These deposits are 
included as benefits because they will be used in part to defray the 
2 
site preparation and fuel treatment costs considered later. The 
current sale package requires slash disposal deposits of $4.04 per 
m.b.f. for live timber and $3.80 per m.b.f. for dead lodgepole and 
dead white pine (second quarter 1981 dollars). Weighting these values 
for the sale volume and deflating to first quarter 1980 dollars gives 
the following deposit value; 
4.04(3280 f 12,200) + 3.80(8920 T 12,200)(.8580) = 3.32 
Adding this deposit value to the above bid value gives a total benefit 
for the Ketchikan Sale of; 49.85 + 3.32 = 53.17 first quarter 1980 
dollars per m.b.f. This value deflates to 45.66 first quarter 1978 
^These cost values include required slash disposal and road 
maintenance deposits^ 
2 
It is assumed here that road maintenance deposits will cover 
road maintenance costs and, thus, cancel each other out. 
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dollars [53.17(147.05 7 171.23)]. 
Table A-1 shows total benefits, by year, expected for the 
Ketchikan Sale. An assumption that 20% of the sale volume will be 
harvested in the first year and 40% in each of the two following 
years was made in the economic analysis prepared by the Forest Service 
for the sale EAR. The same assumption is made here. Benefits are 
attributed to the end of the fiscal year in which they accrue and thus 
the dates listed below are one year later than actual harvest. 
TABLE A-1 
INITIAL ENTRY BENEFITS 
(1st quarter 1978 dollars) 
Volume Stumpage Value Total Benefit 
Year (m.b.f.) x ($/m.b.f.) = [$_) 
1983 2,440 45.66 111,410 
1984 4,880 45.66 222,821 
1985 4,880 45.66 222,821 
Re-entry Stumpage Values 
Stumpage values for future harvests will be predicted following 
the method used by Merzenich (1979). In order to allow for real in-
1 
creases in lumber price, overrun factor and production costs, and to 
maintain the inherent relationships of the stumpage valuation equation, 
future harvest stumpage value must first be calculated using current 
lumber prices, and then adjusted for projected increases in lumber 
price and production cost. Once the current stumpage value is known, 
current production costs can be derived using the formula: 
PC = LP - SV; or SV - (LP - PC) 
1 
Overrun, or recoyery factor, is a measure of milling efficiency. 
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where: 
PC = production cost/m.b.f., log scale 
LP = lumber price/m.b.f., log scale 
SV = stumpage value/m.b.f., log scale 
This formula can also be used to convert current stumpage 
value (SVQ) to projected future stumpage value for year n. If pro­
jected multiplicative increases for lumber price and production 
costs are known for the period 0-n, then projected future stumpage 
value can be claculated using the following relationships; 
PC^ = PCQ X b^ ̂  (b = production cost multiplicative factor) 
LP^ = LPQ X a^ ̂  (a = lumber price multiplicative factor) 
Such multiplicative factors, based on projected increases in 
overrun, lumber price and production costs have been developed for the 
Flathead FORPLAN analysis, using a study by Adams and Haynes (1979). 
The projections model increases in all three factors from 1980 to 
2040, in ten year increments. The Adams and Haynes study indicates 
that each factor will reach its potential limit for increase by 2043. 
The appropriate projection is used below in calculation of future 
stumpage values. 
The same equation used above to predict initial entry stumpage 
value will be used to estimate current stumoage values for future 
entries; however, the equation must be further simplified. Since 
the contract length and SBA variable for future sales are unknown, 
the forest mean for the Flathead equation is used for independent 
variables x^ and x^. It is assumed that there will be no skyline 
logging in future sales, so independent variable x^ drops out. It 
is also assumed that the haul distance will remain 56 miles, so this 
value is used for variable Xg, which becomes part of the constant. 
^9 
The simplified equation thus becomes: 
Y = -288.60 + 0.38UX, - 0.'4954x_ + 101 .36x^ + 0.6037x„ 
13 5 8 
Therefore, the unknowns which remain to be found for each future 
harvest re-entry are; current lumber price, percent volume jammer 
logged, median d.b.h., and volume per acre. To determine the 
appropriate lumber price, each harvest volume must be weighted by 
percent of each species having a different lumber price. First, the 
future harvest schedule must be determined. 
Table A-2 shows the acreage and harvest activity by year for 
each unit in the Ketchikan Sale area, as projected by the Silvicul-
turalist's Diagnonsis and Prescription (Wilson, 1981). The units 
are grouped according to the road segment by which they are accessed. 
Units to be jammer logged are denoted by the letter (J). 
TABLE A-2 





























































































































































































NOTE; CC = clear cut; OR = overstory removal; SW = shelterwood; 
commercial thin; ST = seed tree. 
*Unit 12 is divided into two seperate portions receiving different 
management regimens by the Silviculturalist's Diagnosis and Prescription. 
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Projected volume, species composition, and d.b.h. for each unit 
are given by year in Table A-3. Each factor in Table A-3 was derived 
using the following assumptions: 
Volume; The Silviculturalit's Prescription gives an expected 
yield per acre for each unit, except units 1-3, 13, 14, 22, 
31-34. The volume values in Table A-3 are the product of the 
yield per acre and unit acreage for units projected in the Sil-
viculturalist's Prescription. Volumes for the remaining units 
were calculated with the most appropriate yield tables prepared 
for the Flathead's FORPLAN analysis (USDA, 1981a).^ 
Species Composition; The Silviculturalist's prescription calls 
for planting of larch and Douglas fir and expects natural lodge-
pole regeneration. The silviculturalist expects to attain a 
1:1;1 ratio of these species, and emphasis on removal of the 
lodgepole on the final commercial thin (Wilson, 1982). It is 
assumed here that units receiving one commercial thin will have 
at harvest a species composition of 50% lodgepole for the com­
mercial thin and 25% lodgepole for the regeneration harvest, 
while units receiving two commercial thins will have compositions 
of 50% lodgepole for the first thinning, 75% lodgepole on the 
second thinning, and 100% larch-Douglas fir on the regeneration 
harvest. For units receiving their first regeneration harvest 
1 
The first regeneration harvest used Existing Yield Table 56 for 
units 1-3 and Existing Yield Table 35 for units 13,14 and 22. Sub­
sequent thinning and regeneration harvests used Regenerated Yield Table 
5 for units 1-3 and Regenerated Yield Table 7 for units 13, 14, 22, 
31-34. The yields in these tables are in cubic feet and were converted 
to board feet using conversion factors in the Flathead FORPLAN data base. 
during the second (rather than initial) entry, the species 
composition is projected from the stand composition and removal 
pattern outlined in the Silviculturalist's Diagnosis and Pre­
scription. Harvest volumes for years 2002, 2012 and 2082 are 
100% larch-Douglas fir, years 2042 and 2052 are 59% lodgepole, 
and year 2062 is 75% lodgepole, except as footnoted.^ 
d.b.h.; Expected d.b.h. for each unit was projected using the 
yield tables in the Flathead FORPLAN Economics Coefficient 
Documentation (USDA 1981a). The appropriate yield table was 
selected on the basis of productivity (by Habitat Type Group) 
and management intensity shown for each unit in the Silvicul­
turalist's Diagnosis and Prescription. 
1 
EYT 35 was used for all first regeneration cuts and overstory 
removals except units 1-3, which used EYT 56. RYT 7 was used for the 
remaining harvests, except; units 12 (second part), 17, 23 and 36-RYT 









































dbh mbf dbh mbf dbh mbf dbh mbf dbh mbf dbh 
11 .1 8.06^ 9.5 
11 .1 - - - — - 16.12 9.5 - -
11 .1 - - - - - 29.55^ 9.5 - -
- - 22.43 10.7 - - 23.06 13.3 110.92 15.6 
12.2 - 98.67 10.7 - - 101.44 13.3 488.05 15.6 
12.2 - 8.97 10.7 - - 9.22 13.3 44.37 15.6 
12.2 - 116.61 10.7 - - 119.89 13.3 567.78 15.6 
12.2 - 49.34 10.7 - - 50.72 13.3 244.02 15.6 
12.2 - 304.98 10.7 - - 313.55 13.3 1 ,508.51 15.6 
- - 345.35 10.7 - - 355.05 13.3 1 ,708.17 15.6 
- - 53.82 10.7 - - 55.33 13.3 266.21 15.6 
- - 76.25 10.7 - - 78.39 13.3 377.13 15.6 
- - - - - 65.03 12.0 - - 312.94 15.6 
12.2 - - - - - 55.49^ 10.7 76.42® 13.3 
12.2 - - - - - 44.39 10.7 61 .13 13.3 
12.2 - 210.80 10.7 - - 216.72 13.3 1 ,042.65 15.6 
- - 520.26 10.7 - - 534.88 13.3 2 ,573.34 15.6 








- - 417.11 10.7 - - 428.82 13.3 2 ,063.11 15.6 
- - 112.12 10.7 - - 115.23 13.3 554.60 15.6 
12.2 - 215.28 10.7 - - 221.33 13.3 1 ,064.83 15.6 
12.2 - - - - - 136.88 10.7 188.49^ 13.3 















TABLE A-3 Continued 
2002 2012 2042 2052 2062 2082 
(100% L-DF) (100% L-DF) (50% LP) (50% LP) (75% LP) (100% L--DF) 
unit mbf dbh mbf dbh mbf dbh mbf dbh mbf dbh mbf dbh 
2k  35.01 10.6 _ 168.50^ 13.8 
30 _ — — - - 105.04 10.6 p - 505.51g 13.8 
31 96.60 15.7 100.80 16.0 - - - - 51.79^ 10.7 71.32 13.3 
32 42.00 15.7 21 .00 16.0 - - - - 18.50^ 10.7 25.47g 13.3 
33 124.20 15.7 129.60 16.0 - - - - 66.59^ 10.7 91.70^ 13.3 
34 12.20 15.7 5.30 16.0 - - - - 3.70 10.7 5.09 13.3 
35 27.00 15.T - - 22.43 10.7 - - 23.06 13.3 110.92 , 15.6 
36 _ — — - - 130.05 12.0 - - 625.87 15.6 
37 224.00 15.7 — — 179.40 10.7 - - 184.44 13.3 887.36 15.6 
38 - — - - 192.86 9.5 - - 198.27 11.8 953.91 13.8 






Unit 12 is divided into two seperate portions receiving different management regimens by the Sil-
vlculturallst's Diagnosis and Prescription. 
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Table A-4 uses data from Table A-3 to show total volume by 
species for each future harvest. The volumes are rounded to the 
nearest ten thousand board feet. 
TABLE A-4 
Future Harvest Volume by Species 
(m.b.f.) 
Species 2002 2012 2042 2052 2062 2082 
L-DF 2,170 260 1 ,470 245 930 16,060 
LP 0 0 1 ,470 245 2,540 1 ,340 
S-0 120 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 2,290 260 2,940 490 3,470 17,400 
Now that future harvest volumes by species are known, current 
weighted lumber prices may be calculated for each harvest. This is 
shown in Table A-5 using species and volume data from Table A-4, and 
lumber prices from the 1/29/82 letter to FSM 2420 {Combes, 1982). 
The values for lumber price, log scale, appearing in the last two 
columns of Table A-5 have been deflated to first quarter 1980 dollars 
using the GNP Implicit Price indices 171.23 4- 199.58, and to first 
quarter 1978 dollars with the indices 147.05 t 199.58. Lumber price, 
log scale, must be in 1980 dollars for use in the stumpage valuation 
equation, while the present discounted value analysis in Appendix F 
uses 1978 dollars. 
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TABLE A-5 
Weighted Lumber Prices for Future Harvests 












Total Weighted Value/m.b.f. 


















































Total Weighted Value/m.b.f. 256.38 220.18 
At last, all the necessary information is available to allow 
computation of current stumpage values for future harvests. Table A-6 
shows variable values and results of this computation, using the 
simplified valuation equation derived earlier: 
Y = -288.60 + 0.3814X, - 0.4954x^ + 101.36x^ + 0.6037x„ 
1 J D O 
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The values for the independent variables shown inTable A-6 are taken 
from the following sources: 
= weighted lumber price, log scale (first quarter 1980 
dollars) from Table A-5 
x^ = % volume jammer logged from Table A-2 (units jammer logged), 
Table A-3 (volume for each jammer unit) divided by total 
harvested volume (Table A-4) 
x^ = natural log of weighted d.b.h. from data in Table A-3 
D 
x_ = volume per acre harvested (m.b.f.) from Table A-A (total 
o 
volume) divided by total acres harvested in Table A-2 
Y (first quarter 1980 dollars) is converted in the final column to 
stumpage value in first quarter 19T8 dollars with the GNP Implicit 
Price indices; 147.05 t 171.23. 
TABLE A-6 
Derivation of Current Stumpage Value for 
Future Harvests 
Y SV 
(1st qtr (1st qtr 
Year x^ x^ x^ x^ 1980$) 1978$) 
2002 258.08 2.2 2.565 5.9 72.29 62.08 
2012 258.36 11 .5 2.773 6.8 89.42 76.79 
2042 245.98 1 .7 2.398 4.5 52.24 45.12 
2052 245.98 24.5 2.398 5.1 39.22 33.68 
2062 240.28 2.3 2.565 4.5 64.61 55.49 
2082 256.38 4.9 2.708 20.4 93.55 80.34 
The current stumpage values derived for each harvest in Table 
A-6 can now be converted to future stumpage values incorporating the 
projected increases in lumber price, production costs and overrun. 
This is done below for each future harvest using the relationships 
mentioned earlier: 
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^ ̂ 0-n 
LP = LP- X b„ 
n 0 0-n 
SV = LP - PC 
n n n 
Combining these equations gives the equation used in Table A-7: 
SV = (LP^ X a) - [(LP_ - SV^) X b ] 
n o  0  0  
Current weighted lumber price (LP^) is taken from Table A-5. Current 
sturapage value (SV^) is found in Table A-6. Lumber price and pro­
duction cost multiplicative factors for each harvest are taken from 
1 
the Flathead FORPLAN Adams and Haynes projections. 
Finally, the projected dollar benefits for each future harvest 
can be calculated for each year by simply multiplying the future 
stumpage values in Table A-7 by the total volumes in Table A-4.. The 
results appear in Table A-8. Benefits are attributed to the end of 
the fiscal year in which they accrue and thus the dates listed below 
are one year later than the actual harvest. 
1 
Year 2002 uses projections for the period 1980-2010 (median 
year 2005); year 2012 uses projections for the period 1980-2020 
(median year 2015); the remaining harvests use projections for the 
period 1980-2040 and beyond (median year 2035) because this is the 
last projection period in the Flathead data and the Adams and Haynes 
projections predict no increases after 2043 (Merzenich, 1979). 
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TABLE A-7 
Projected Future Sturapage Values 
(1st quarter 1978 dollars) 
Current Lum. Price Current Stump. Val. 
Harv. Lum. Price Mult. Fact. Stump. Val. Mult . Fact. 
Date (LPo) (a) (SVq) (b) 
2002 221.64 1 .653 62.08 1 .509 
2012 221.88 1.863 76.79 1 .547 
2042 211.24 2.188 45.12 1 .595 
2052 211.24 2.188 33.68 1 .595 
2062 206.35 2.188 55.49 1 .595 












(1st quarter 1978 dollars) 
Volume Stumpage Value Total Benefit 
Year (m.b.f.) x ($/m.b.f.) = ($) 
2003 2,290 125.99 288,517 
2013 260 188.91 49,117 
2043 2,940 197.23 579,856 
2053 490 178.98 87,700 
2063 3,470 210.87 731,719 
2083 17,400 258.71 4,507,554 
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Appendix B 
ROAD COST ESTIMATES 
Road costs will be incurred both during the initial road con­
struction for the Ketchikan Sale and during reconstruction for each 
subsequent management entry. Since the roads in the sale area will 
be closed during periods of inactivity ranging from 10 to 40 years, 
road reconstruction costs will be significant. Road maintenance 
costs during management activities are assumed to be covered by pur­
chaser deposits. 
In addition to construction or reconstruction costs incurred 
by contractors, road costs must also include those costs incurred by 
the Forest Service for survey, design, layout and administration. 
Road costs estimates for each road segment are developed in Tables 
B-1 and B-2 with assumptions and data sources explained below. 
Table B-3 displays total expected road costs by year (in first quarter 
1978 dollars adjusted from Tables B-1 and B-2 with the GNP Implicit 
Price Deflator Indices: (147.05 7 171.23) for the initial entry, 
and for each re-entry scheduled by the silviculturalist's prescrip­
tions (Wilson, 1981), as shown in Table A-1 (Appendix A). 
It will be assumed here that the road system planned for the 
Ketchikan Sale will not be extended in the future to access additional 
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timber stands. The original proposal presented in the EAR called 
1 
for 4.82 miles of additional road segments (Schluessler, 1981), 
which were deleted in the EAR Supplement as mitigation for wildlife 
habitat. 
Discussions with the Forest highway engineer and District 
timber staff officer involved in planning the Ketchikan Sale indicated 
that, due to terrain and quality of timber stands, extensions of the 
road system beyond what was originally planned in the EAR would 
probably not be feasible (Schluessler, 1982a and Armstrong, 19821). 
Since the potential extensions were deleted as wildlife habitat miti­
gation, it is assumed that this habitat will remain unroaded for the 
duration of the planning horizon in this analysis. 
Initial Road Construction 
Road constuction costs for the Ketchikan Sale are predicted 
here through the use of a recently developed multiple regression 
equation (Jackson and Loveless, 1981). This equation was chosen over 
the Engineer's Cost Estimate in the Sale Prospectus for several rea­
sons: 1 ) The equation is based on 52 road construction and recon­
struction contracts let by the Forest Service Region One during fiscal 
years 1979 and 1980 (adjusted for inflation), and predicts the winning 
bid in first quarter 1980 dollars, while the Engineer's Cost Estimate 
is based on various component cost revisions ranging from December 
1979 to July 1981, with no adjustment for inflation. The equation 
''TWO roads extending north along the west side of Ketchikan 
Creek from road 10428, three roads extending north into the Colts 
Creek drainage from road 10426 and an extension of road 10426 to 
the southern end of Ketchikan Ridge. See map. 
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is derived from actual transaction evidence rather than component 
cost estimates and is as accurate as the Engineer's Cost Estimate 
(Jackson, 1982). The equation has an adjusted of .8553 and a 
standard deviation of 25.19% of theraean predicted bid, or a confidence 
interval of ±50.38% at the 95% confidence level. There is no analysis 
of the statistical reliability of the Engineer's Cost Estimate. (The 
Engineer's Cost Estimate for the original Ketchikan sale was $569,912 
and the comparable bid predicted by the regression equation [total Y 
from Table B-1 ] is $591 ,329, a 3.7% difference). 2) The equation 
predicts initial road construction costs using a relatively limited 
set of standardized inputs, which for this analysis were taken from 
the Schedule of Items in the Ketchikan Sale contract. 3) The equation 
can be used to predict future reconstruction costs for each re-entry 
from existing data, without resorting to the complex recalculations 
which would by necessary if an Engineer's Cost Estimate were used. 
The Jackson and Loveless equation can be expressed as: 
Y = 1975.26(d) + 2534.76x, + 1.26x„ + .37x_ + 7.1Ax, + .12x^ 
1 2 3 4 5 
where ;• 
Y = Total road construction cost in 1st quarter 1980 dollars 
(predicted winning bid) 
d = Total length of road in miles 
x^ = Total acres clearing and grubbing 
x^ = Total cubic yards excavation 
x^ = Total station yards haul 
x^ = Total tons gravel 
X = Sura of the products of squared diameter and length for each 
size class of culvert (B D^xL) 
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Table B-1 shows the computation of total road cost for the Ket­
chikan Sale. Values for each variable in the above equation, taken 
from the sale contract, are listed first. Given next are the products 
of the variable values and the corresponding coefficient in the above 
equation. Haul and gravel values are not shown because none were given 
in the schedule of items. The predicted bid is then adjusted downward 
to allow for Bacon-Davis wage rates^ and recent trends in. road con-
2 struction bidding (Adj. Y). Total road costs by road segment are de­
rived by adding these construction costs to Forest Service engineering 
and administration costs, which were estimated in the development of 
FORPLAN to be $6200 per mile (first quarter 1978 dollars) on the Flat­
head National Forest (USDA 1981a, p. E-5 9 of 11). This converts to 
7220 first quarter 1980 dollars using the GNP Implicit Price Deflator 
Indicies: 171.23 t 147.05. Completion dates come from the Prospectus. 
1 
Construction contracts let by the federal government must comply 
with wage rates set by the Bacon-Davis Act, while purchasers building 
roads may use lower rates prevailing in the area. This is why the En­
gineer's Cost Estimate (based on Bacon-Davis rates) is higher than the 
Purchaser Credit Limit (the estimated cost to a purchaser). The orig­
inal Engineer's Cost Estimate $569,912 while the Purchaser Credit Limit 
was $555,833; 97.53% of the Engineer's Estimate. Since the Jackson and 
Loveless equation is based on contracts using Bacon-Davis rates, the 
predicted bid (Y) is reduced by the factor .9753. 
2 Based on this trend in road construction bidding (analyzed by 
the Northern Region Office) the Purchaser Credit Limit for the Ketchi­
kan Sale was reduced from the original $555,833 to $463,897; 83.46% of 
the original estimate (Armstrong, 1982b). Thus, the predicted bid (Y) 
is further reduced by the factor .8346 (giving a total reduction factor 
of .9753 X .8346 = .8140). One possible explanation for this downward 
trend is that the recessionary economy has created a shortage of con­
struction projects, and thus a surplus of construction equipment. 
Faced with fixed capital costs, contractors may be lowering their bids 
below normal in an attempt to keep their equipment working, generating 
cash flows to service debts. 
TABLE B-1 
Initial Entry Road Costs 








d (total miles) 
(acres clear and grub) 
X (yards^ excavation) 
X (X[D^ X L] culverts) 
Y (Predicted Bid) 
Adj. Y (tot. const, cost [Y x .814] 
F.S. eng. & admin. ($7220/mi.) 






1,935.75 5.30 10,468.88 
11,913.37 24.20 61,341.19 
5,929.56 22,246 28,029-96 
29,635.20 699,048 83,885.76 
49,413.88 183,725.79 
40,222.18 149,603.86 
7,075.62 5.30 38,266.00 







1 .76 12,707.20 
86,340 
Completion Date 1982 1983 1983 
Rd #114 Rd #1048-1 Rd #1048-2 
Coefficient value $ value $ value $ 
d (total miles) 3.51 6,933.16 1.88 3,713.49 1.36 2,686.35 
x^ (acres clear and grub) 19.39 49,149.00 9.84 24,942.04 7.40 18,757.22 
X2 (yards' excavation) 16,795 21,161.70 16,935 21,338.10 15,549 19,591.74 
X5 (S[D' X L] culverts) 193,104 23,172.48 389,952 46,794.24 246,024 29,522.88 
Y (Predicted Bid) 100,416.34 96,787.82 70,558.19 
Adj. Y (tot. const, cost [Y x .814]) 81,766.81 78,812.19 57,453.98 
F.S. eng. & admin. ($7220/mi.) 3.51 25,342.80 1.88 13,573.60 1.36 9,819.20 
TOTAL ROAD COST 107,110 92,386 67,273 
Completion Date 1982 1982 1983 
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Future Road Reconstruction 
After the initial entry, current plans are to close all area 
roads for a 20 year period, followed by a re-entry for timber harvest 
and management activities. Similar re-entries could occur thereafter 
in periods ranging from 10 to 40 years (Wilson, 1981). The project 
engineer expects reconstruction costs after 20 years of closure to be 
essentially limited to clearing the road bed of vegetation and repair­
ing any damage to drainage structures. After a 40 year closure, it was 
considered uncertain whether or not culverts would have to be replaced 
(Turner, 1982). In order to use the Jackson and Loveless equation to 
predict future reconstruction costs, it is assumed here that recon­
struction activity will be limited to clearing and grubbing an average 
14 foot wide roadway during each entry, with replacement of all cul­
verts during the first entry made more than 60 years after the initial 
entry. Forest Service engineering and administration costs for recon­
struction were estimated to be approximately half of the value used for 
new roads in FORPLAN (Schluessler, 1982b). 
Table B-2 shows expected road costs associated with future re­
entries, by road segment (both with and without culvert replacement). 
Variable values (except x-| ) are taken form Table B-1 . Costs associated 
with Road #114 are not shown in Table B-2 because it is a system road 
which should receive normal maintenance, and therefore may not require 
reconstruction attributable solely to timber management in the Ketchi­
kan area. Acreage cleared and grubbed is calculated by multiplying 
average road width (14 feet) by road length in feet and dividing by 
square feet per acre (43,560). 
TABLE B-2 
Re-entry Road Costs 
(1st quarter 1980 dollars) 
Rd #10A6-1 Rd #1046-2 Rd #1047 
Coefficient value | value $ value $ 
d (total miles) .98 1,935.75 5.30 10,A68.88 1.76 3,713.49 
(acres clear and grub) 1.66 4,207.70 8.99 22,787.49 2.99 7,578.49 
F.S. eng. & adm. ($36l0/rai.) .98 3,537.80 5.30 19,133.00 1.76 6,353.60 
RECONSTRUCTION WITHOUT CULVERTS 9,681.25 52,389.37 17,408.99 
xc; (£[D' X L] culverts) 246,960 29,635.20 699,048 83,885.76 392,112 47,053.44 






d (total miles) 
x-| (acres clear and grub) 
F.S. eng. & adm. ($36l0/mi.) 
RECONSTRUCTION WITHOUT CULVERTS 
X5 ("[D^ X L] culverts) 

























Total Road Costs 
(1st quarter 1978 dollars) 
Rd. Rd. Rd. Rd. Rd. Rd. Total 
Year #1046-1 #1046-2 #1047 #114 #1048-1 #1048-2 Cost 
1982 40,619 91,985 79,340 211,944 
1983 — 161,340 74,148 — — 57,773 293,261 
2002 8,314 44,991 14,951 — 15,962 11,552 95,770 
2012 — — — — 15,962 11,552 27,514 
2042 33,764 117,031 55,359 — 56,148 — 262,302 
2052 — 44,991 — — 15,962 36,906 97,859 
2062 8,314 44,991 14,951 — 15,962 11,552 95,770 
2082 8,314 44,991 14,951 — 15,962 11,552 95,770 
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Appendix C 
SALE PREPARATION AND ADMINISTRATION 
COST ESTIMATES 
The Flathead FORPLAN Economic Coefficient Documentation (USDA, 
1981a) is the source for sale preparation (p. E-1E 13) and adminis­
tration (p. E-1e 16) costs used here. The documentation arrays 
estimated costs for these activities, on a per acre bases, according 
to harvest method, unit size and yarding method projected for the 
Ketchikan Sale area over the next 100 years. Table C-1 was constructed 
using data from Table A-1, and appropriate costs from Appendix E in 
the Flathead coefficient documentation. 
Table C-2 estimates sale preparation costs for each harvest 
and Table C-3 estimates sale administration costs for each harvest. 
Both tables use the cost classes from Table C-1 and acreages from 
Table A-1. (It should be noted that these costs are based on Forest-
wide averages applied to site-specific factors. Actual preparation 
costs for the Ketchikan Sale may be much higher than average due to 
the sale's highly controversial nature and extended appeals process, 
which have not be representative of Forest-wide average timber sales. 
The Forest Service could not give an estimate for the appeals costs 
attributable to the Ketchikan Sale, but off-the-cuff estimates of 
Region-wide average timber sale appeals costs ranged from $2,000 -
$5,000. It was generally agreed that the appeals costs for the Ket-
chikan Sale were probably higher than average.) 
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TABLE C-1 
Sale Preparation and Administration 
Cost Classes 
(1st quarter 1978 dollars) 
Cost Site Factors Cost($) 
Class Harv. Methodl Unit Size (acres) Yard. Method Prep. Admin 
AIT CC-ST 0-2 Tractor 152 45 
A2T CC-ST 3-10 Tractor 115 37 
A2J CC-ST 3-10 Jammer 136 53 
A3T CC-ST 11-20 Tractor 92 30 
A3J CC-ST 11-20 Jammer 97 45 
AAT CC-ST >20 Tractor 84 23 
BIT SW-CT 0-2 Tractor 234 53 
B1J SW-CT 0-2 Jammer 273 68 
B2T SW-CT 3-10 Tractor 140 45 
B2J SW-CT 3-10 Jammer 157 60 
B3T SW-CT 11-20 Tractor 102 37 
B3J SW-CT 11-20 Jammer 109 53 
B4T SW-CT >20 Tractor 86 23 
C1T OR 0-2 Tractor 152 53 
C1J OR 0-2 Jammer 172 68 
C2T OR 3-10 Tractor 115 45 
C2J OR 3-10 Jammer 125 60 
C3T OR 11-20 Tractor 95 37 
C4T OR >20 Tractor 91 23 
^CC.= clear cut; ST = seed tree; SW = 
cial thin; OR - overstory removal. 
shelterwood; CT = commer-
TABLE C-2 
Sale Preparation Costs 
{1st quarter 1978 dollars) 
1981 2001 2011 2041 2051 2061 2081 
Cost 
$ $ Class $/acre ac $ ac $ ac $ ac $ ac $ ac ac 
AIT 152 2 304 
A2T 115 5 575 9 1 ,035 — 10 1 ,150 
A2J 136 21 2,856 — — — — — — — — — — 21 2,856 
A3T 92 43 3,956 38 3,496 — 54 4,968 
A3J 97 12 1 ,164 — — — — — — — — — — 12 1 ,164 
AAT BA 401 33,684 22 1 ,848 — 652 54,768 
BIT 234 2 468 2 468 — — 2 468 — — 
B1J 273 1 273 1 273 — — — — — — 1 273 1 273 
B2T 140 14 1 ,848 — — — — 10 1,400 — — 19 2,660 — — 
B2J 157 5 785 5 785 — — — — 21 3,297 5 785 5 785 
B3T 102 81 8,262 32 3,264 — — 28 2,856 26 2,652 98 9,996 59 6,081 
B3J 109 12 1,308 — — 12 1 ,308 — — 
B4T 86 288 24,768 505 43,430 47 4,042 542 46,612 37 3,182 
C1T 152 — — 2 304 — — — — — — — — — — 
C1J 172 1 172 
C2T 115 — — 5 575 — 
C2J 125 — 5 625 
C3T 95 — — 11 1 ,045 32 3,040 
C4T 91 — — 262 23,742 
Total Cost 78,751 36,467 3,837 49,462 9,991 62,102 72,531 
TABLE C-3 
Sale Administration Costs 
(1st quarter 1978 dollars) 
1983* 2002 2012 2042 2052 2062 2082 
Cost 
Class $/acre ac $ ac $ ac "$ ac $ a^ $ ac $ ac $ 
AIT 42 2 90 
A2T 37 5 185 • 9 333 10 370 
A2J 53 21 1,113 21 1,113 
A3T 30 43 1 ,290 38 1 ,140 54 1 ,620 
A3J 45 12 540 12 540 
A4T 23 401 9,223 22 506 652 14,996 
BIT 53 2 106 — — — — 2 106 — — 2 106 — — 
B1J 68 1 68 1 68 — — — — — 1 68 1 68 
B2T 45 14 630 — — — — 10 450 — — 19 855 — — 
B2J 60 5 300 5 300 — — — — 21 1 ,260 5 300 5 300 
B3T 37 81 2,997 32 1 ,184 — — 28 1,036 26 962 98 3,626 59 2,183 
B3J 53 — — — — — — 12 636 — — 12 636 — — 
B4T 23 288 6,624 505 11,615 47 1 ,081 542 12,466 37 851 
C1T 53 — — 2 106 — — — — — — — — — 
CU 68 1 68 
C2T 45 — — 5 225 
C2J 60 5 300 
C3T 37 — — 11 407 32 1 ,184 
C4T 23 — — 262 6 ,026 — — — — — — — — — — 
TOTAL COST: 23,076 10 ,295 1 ,552 13,843 3 ,303 18,057 22,131 
* 20% in 1982, 40% in 1983 and 40% in 1984. 
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Appendix D 
•SITE PREPARATION AND FUEL TREATMENT 
COST ESTIMATES 
Economic analyses of timber management often attempt to seperate 
site preparation costs (those associated with regeneration) from fuel 
treatment or slash disposal costs (those associated with fire hazard 
reduction). The seperation can be difficult and subjective because 
single activities often accomplish both objectives (e.g. broadcast 
burning both prepares a site for planting and reduces the fuel load) 
and funds collected or appropriated for one objective are often used 
to accomplish the other (Merzenich, 1979). It is often argued that 
such a seperation must be made, however, so that only regeneration 
costs will be charged to timber management while slash disposal costs 
are charged to fire management. 
No such seperation is made in this analysis. Both fuel treat­
ment and site preparation costs are included here for the following 
reasons. Both regeneration costs and slash disposal costs are 
quantifiable and will be incurred as a direct result of timber manage­
ment activities. None of the costs used here would be incurred in 
the absence of timber harvesting. While the benefits associated with 
fuel treatment are not accounted here, in so far as they are quan­
tifiable they are predominately attributable to the timber resource. 
It must be remembered that many costs associated with the Ketchikan 
Sale have not been quantified and accounted for here. Furthermore, 
wildfire can also have minimal or even beneficial impacts on non-
commodity resource values such as wildlife habitat. 
Site preparation and fuel treatment costs are taken from the 
Flathead FORPLAN Economic Coefficient Documentation (USDA, 1981a). 
These costs vary according to site factors such as unit size, harvest 
method and percent slope. Table D-1 shows cost classes for projected 
activities and site factors (as shown in Table A-2) in the Ketchikan 
Sale area for the next 100 years. Percent slope is assumed to be 
less than 40% for all units except those which are jammer logged. 
It is assumed that all shelterwood or seedtree units will be dozer 
piled (D4 tractor), except cost class 7, following the instructions 
in the Silviculturalist's Diagnosis and Prescription (Wilson, 1981). 
Zero costs are assumed for precommercial and commercial thins. 
Expected total costs for site preparation and fuel treatment 
are shown by year in Table D-2. Cost values are taken from Table D-1 
while acres treated are derived from Table A-1, the Silviculturalist' 
Diagnosis and Prescription (Wilson, 1981), and the current sale 
package (Armstrong, 1982b). 
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TABLE D-1 
Site Preparation and Fuel Treatment Cost Classes 
(1st quarter 1978 dollars) 
Cost Class Unit Size (ac) Harvest Method % Slope Cost/Acre 
1 >19 CC <40 254 
2 5-19 CC <40 267 
3 5-19 CC >40 1,000 
4 >19 SW-ST <40 141 
5 5-19 SW-ST <40 148 
6 0-.4 SW-ST <40 199 
7 <<<<<<<<<<<(Shelterwood Underburn)>>»>>>>>» 1,000 
8 «<«« (O^erstory Removal-Pile Burning)»»» 10 
NOTE: CC = clear cut; SW = shelterwood; ST = seedtree. 
TABLE D-2 
Site Preparation and Fuel Treatment Costs 
(1st quarter 1978 dollars) 
Cost 1984* 2003 2013 2083 
Class $/acre ac $ ac $ ac $ ac $ 
1 254 31 7,874 37 9,398 — 31 7,874 
2 267 37 7,879 29 7,209 — — 37 1 ,879 
3 1 ,000 10 1 ,000 10 1 ,000 
4 141 276 38,916 276 38,916 
5 148 21 3,108 54 7,992 — — 21 3,108 
6 199 2 398 4 796 — — 2 398 
7 1 ,000 — — — — 38 38,000 — — 
8 10 — — 299 2,990 
Total Cost 51,296 28,385 38,000 51 ,296 
*20% in 1983, 40% in 1984 and 40% in 1985. 
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Appendix E 
PLANTING, STOCKING SURVEY AND PRECOMMERCIAL 
THINNING COST ESTIMATES 
Cost values for planting, stocking surveys and precommercial 
thinning are taken from the Flathead FORPLAN Economic Coefficient 
Documentation (USDA, 1981a). Total planting costs (first quarter 
1978 dollars) on the Flathead National Forest average $158 per acre 
for a full 10' X 10' planting and $118 per acre for a planting of 
200 trees per acre (this is slightly less than 20' x 20' planting 
which would require 218 trees per acre). The Silviculturalist's 
Prescription makes regeneration recommendations including 9' x 9', 
10' X 10', 12' X 12', 14' X 14' plantings and natural regeneration 
(Wilson, 1981). Although these alternatives do not correspond 
exactly to the cost classes used in the Flathead FORPLAN, costs for 
9' x 9' and 12' x 12' plantings are assumed to be equivalent to 
10' X 10' planting, and 14' x 14' planting is assumed to be equiva­
lent to 200 trees per acre. 
Actual costs would probably be slightly higher. Planting costs 
may also be underestimated here because planting is assumed to be 
accomplished the second year after a regeneration harvest with 100% 
success, and no allowance is made here for the above average hand-
scalping which will probably be required. (In order to reduce slash 
disposal costs, the sale package was revised over the winter to 
require tree length yarding on most clearcut units. This would 
eliminate the need for most of the expensive broadcast burning 
originally scheduled for those units, but would increase the need 
for handscalping during planting). 
Stocking surveys and certifications occur over a four to five 
year period after planting. Costs (first quarter 1978 dollars) are 
approximately $5 per acre for natural regeneration, $6 per acre for 
overstory removals, and $7 per acre for plantings (USDA, 1981a, 
E-1E3, E-5). For dating purposes, stocking survey costs are assumed 
to be centered on the second year after planting. 
Total precommercial thinning costs average $178 per acre on 
the Flathead (USDA, 1981a, E-1E 7). Where scheduled, precommercial 
thinning is assumed to occur 22 years after the regeneration harvest. 
Tables E-1 , E-2 and E-3 give total expected planting, stocking 























Following the staggered initial harvest, assume 20% 1984, 
40% 1985, 40% 1986. 
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TABLE E-2 
Stocking Survey Costs 
(1st quarter 1978 dollars) 
1987*^ 2006 2016 
acres $/acre $ acres $/acre $ acres $/acre 
162 5 810 37 5 185 5 
— 6 — 273 6 1 ,644 38 6 
591 7 4,137 85 7 595 — 7 
TOTAL COST 4,947^^ 2,424 288 
^Following the staggered initial harvest, assume 20% 1986, 40% 
1987, 40% 1988. 
TABLE E-3 
Precomraercial Thinning Costs 
(1st quarter 1978 dollars) 
acres $/acre $ acres $/acre $ 




The present net value and benefit/cost ratio for the Ketchikan 
Sale can now be calculated using the data generated in the preceeding 
appendices. Table F-1 lists total expected costs by year for: sale 
preparation (Table C-2), sale administration (Table C-3), road costs 
(Table B-3), site preparation and fuel treatment (Table D-2), planting 
(Table E-1), stocking survey (Table E-2) and precoramercial thinning 
(Table E-3). These costs are discounted to the present for discount 
rates 4%, 7 1/8% and 10% in Table F-2 using the formula; 
VQ = Ml . i)" 
where: 
VQ = discounted present value 
= total value at year n 
n = year of accrual 
i = discount rate 
The same formula was used in Table F-3 to discount the expected 
benefits (from Tables A-1 and A-8). The present net values and benefit/ 
cost ratios for the Ketchikan Sale (Case 1 and Case 2, p. 32) were 
derived from Tables F-2 and F-3. First quarter 1978 dollars were con­
verted to fourth quarter 1981 dollars with the GNP Implicit Price 































Total Expected Costs 
(1st quarter 1978 dollars) 
Sale Sale Road Site Stck Total 
Prep Admin Costs Prep Planting Surv Thinning Cost 
78,751 — — 78,751 
— 4,615 211,944 — — — 216,559 
— 9,231 293,267 10,260 — — — 303,521 
— 9,230 — 20,518 17,580 — — 47,328 
— — — 20,519 35,159 — — 55,615 
— — — — 35,159 990 — 36,149 
— — — — — 1 ,979 — 1 ,979 
— — — — — 1 ,978 — 1 ,978 
36,467 — — — — — — 36,467 
— 10,295 95,770 — — — 134,034 240,099 
— — — 28,385 — — — 28,385 
— — — — 17,756 — — 17,756 
— — — — — 2,424 — 2,424 
3,837 — — — — — — 3,837 
— 1 ,552 27,514 — — — — 29,066 
— — — 38,000 — — — 38,000 
— — — — — 228 — 228 
— — — — — — 21 ,716 21,716 
49,462 — — — — — — 49,462 
- - 13,843 262,302 — — — — 276,145 
9,991 — — — — — — 9,991 
— 3,303 97,859 — — — — 101 ,162 
62,102 — — — — — — 62,102 
— 18,057 95,770 — — — — 113,827 
75,531 — — — — — — 75,531 
— 22,131 95,770 — — — — 117,901 
— — — 51,296 — — — 51,296 
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TABLE F-2 
Discounted Total Costs 
(1st quarter 1978 dollars) 
Total 
Discount Factor Discounted Cost 
Year Cost 4% 7 1 /8% 10% 4% 7 1/8% 10% 
1981 78,751 1 .040 1 .071 1 .100 81,901 84,342 86,626 
1982 216,559 1 .000 1 .000 1 .000 216,559 216,559 216,559 
1983 305,512 .9615 .9335 .9091 291,827 283,328 275,923 
1984 47,328 .9246 .8714 .8264 43,759 41,242 39,112 
1985 55,615 .8890 .8134 .7513 49,442 45,237 41 ,778 
1986 36,149 .8548 .7593 .6830 30,900 27,448 24,690 
1987 1 ,979 .8219 .7088 .6209 1 ,627 1 ,403 1 ,229 
1088 1 ,978 .7903 .6617 .5645 1 ,563 1 ,309 1 ,117 
2001 36,467 .4746 .2704 .1635 17,312 9,863 5,964 
2002 240,099 .4564 .2525 .1486 109,581 60,625 35,679 
2003 28,385 .4388 .2357 .1351 12,455 6,690 3,835 
2004 17,756 .4220 .2200 .1228 7,493 3,906 2,180 
2006 2,424 .3901 .1917 .1015 946 465 246 
2011 3,837 .3207 .1359 .0630 1 ,231 533 242 
2012 29,066 .3083 .1268 .0573 8,961 3,686 1 ,665 
2013 38,000 .2965 .1184 .0521 11,267 4,499 1 ,980 
2016 228 .2636 .0963 .0391 60 23 9 
2022 21 ,716 .2083 .0637 .0221 4,523 1 ,383 480 
2041 49,462 .0989 .0172 .0036 4,892 851 178 
2042 276,145 .0951 .0161 .0033 26,261 4,446 911 
2051 9,991 .0668 .0087 .0014 667 87 14 
2052 101 ,162 .0642 .0081 .0013 6,495 819 132 
2061 62,102 .0451 .0044 .0005 2,801 273 31 
2062 113,827 .0434 .0041 .0005 4,940 467 57 
2081 75,531 .0206 .0011 .0001 1 ,556 83 8 
2082 117,901 .0198 .0010 .0010 2,334 118 12 
2083 51,296 .0190 .0010 -.0001 3,975 51 5 
DISCOUNTED TOTAL COST 942,368 799,776 740,702 
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TABLE F-3 
Discounted Total Benefits 
(1st quarter 1978 dollars) 
Discount Factor Discounted Benefit 
Year Benefit 4% 7 1/8% 10% 4% 7 1/8% 10% 
1983 111 ,410 .9615 .9335 .9091 107,121 104,002 101,283 
1984 222.821 .9246 .8714 .8264 206,021 194,166 184,139 
1985 222,821 .8890 .8134 .7513 198,088 181,242 167,405 
2003 288,517 .4388 .2357 .1351 126,601 68,003 38,979 
2013 49,117 .2965 .1184 .0521 14,565 5,815 2,559 
2043 579,856 .0914 .0150 .0030 52,999 8,698 1 ,740 
2053 87,700 .0617 .0075 .0012 5,411 658 105 
2063 731,719 .0417 .0038 .0004 30,513 2,781 293 
2083 731,719 .0190 .0010 .0001 85,530 4,502 450 
DISCOUNTED TOTAL BENEFIT 826,847 569,867 496,953 
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